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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, a half-century after the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals, a
diplomatic conference finalized the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC). 1 Only four years later, that treaty entered into force following its
ratification by sixty states. The creation of a permanent, global tribunal to
prosecute those responsible for the worst international crimes fulfilled a dream
kept alive throughout the Cold War.
International human rights activists, diplomats, and jurists offered grand
ambitions for the ICC. It would not only punish political leaders and military
commanders who had committed genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes, but also would deter others from committing such mass atrocities. After
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, hope had surged among the international
liberal elite that they could create a new, peaceful world order in which mass
atrocities would be rare, and in which those responsible would be called to
account. While sobered by the failure of international powers to stop genocide
and crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the early
1990s, they were heartened by the UN Security Council's creation of new
international criminal courts: the "ad hoc" International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in 1993, and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR), in 1994. "To tribunal advocates, [the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR]
represent[ed] the zenith of the international human rights movement. With such
institutions in place, getting away with mass murder would no longer be the norm
but the exception."2
Today, a quarter-century later, the record of international criminal tribunals
is disappointing and the prospects for similar initiatives look bleak. International
criminal law has not ushered in a new world order.4 The ICTY took nearly
twenty-five years and approximately three billion dollars to try just over 100
defendants. 5 Partially international "hybrid" tribunals created by the United
Nations and the governments of Cambodia and Sierra Leone have spent tens of
millions of dollars to convict fewer than ten defendants each. Trials in all these
tribunals have proceeded excruciatingly slowly, taking years from arraignment
through appeal. In several cases, justice delayed has become justice denied. For
example, former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and former Khmer
Rouge Foreign Minister leng Sary died four and two years into their respective
' Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome
Statute].
2 VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS: VIRTUAL TRIALS AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR STATE COOPERATION 5 (2008).
' The ICTR closed in 2015, and the ICTY dissolved two years later. See A bout, UNITED NATIONS INT'L
RESIDUAL MECHANISM FOR CRIM. TRIBUNALS, http://www.irmct.org/en/about (last visited Nov. 15,
2019).
4 See, e.g., James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Never Again? The Legacy of the Argentine and
Chilean Dictatorships for the Global Human Rights Regime, 39 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 233, 238-44 (2008).
5 See Stuart Ford, Complexity and Efficiency at International Criminal Courts, 29 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
1, 36-37 (2014) (estimating the ICTY's total cost in constant 2012 dollars); Key Figures of the Cases,
UNITED NATIONS INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
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trials at the ICTY and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC): their cases terminated with no findings as to guilt.6 People in the
regions subject to these international criminal tribunals have reacted to their
work with ambivalence at best. The modest impacts of the ICTY and ICTR on
politics, law, and intercommunal reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda have been a major theme ofjournalism and scholarship on those courts.7
Most important, atrocities remain common: governments and insurgents
continue to torture and slaughter civilians in Syria, Nigeria, Yemen, Myanmar,
and elsewhere.8
By late 2019, the most important international criminal tribunal, the ICC,
was approaching a crisis point as it failed in case after case to convict-and in
many cases to try or even apprehend-perpetrators of appalling crimes. While
other tribunals had arrested, tried, and convicted the vast majority of perpetrators
they had charged, ICC prosecutors had secured just four convictions for mass
atrocities in seventeen years, out of thirty-seven indictees.9 Worse still, the ICC's
judges had acquitted four other defendants,10 a far higher rate-fifty percent-
than at other international criminal tribunals.11 International criminal law experts
were dismayed in June 2018 when the ICC Appeals Chamber freed Jean-Pierre
Bemba, overturning the warlord's conviction, after a four-year trial, for murder,
pillage, and sexual violence in the Central African Republic.1 2 This bombshell
was followed in January 2019 by the Trial Chamber's abrupt termination of
proceedings against another high-profile defendant, former C6te d'Ivoire
President Laurent Gbagbo, for crimes against humanity; the judges held the
prosecutors' evidence insufficient to prove guilt. Other high-profile cases,
including against sitting and former heads of State of Sudan and Kenya, have
collapsed or stalled. The July 2019 conviction of Bosco Ntaganda barely eased
the crisis. The ICC's authority is under siege: multiple ICC Member States
welcomed Sudan's indicted then-President Omar Al Bashir, flouting their
6 Marlise Simons & Alison Smale, Slobodan Milosevic, 64, Former Yugoslav Leader Accused of War
Crimes, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/world/europe/slobodan-milosevic-64-former-yugoslav-leader-
accused-of-war.html; Khmer Rouge Senior Leader Jeng Sary Dies, BBC (Mar. 14, 2013),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21781153.
7 See, e.g., DIANE ORENTLICHER, SOME KIND OF JUSTICE: THE ICTY's IMPACT IN BOSNIA AND SERBIA
193-295 (2018); Marieke I. Wierda, The Local Impact of a Global Court: Assessing the Impact of the
International Criminal Court in Situation Countries 90-92 (Jan. 9, 2019) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Leiden University), http://hdl.handle.net/1 887/68230.
8 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2017 WORLD REPORT 571-78 (2017) (Syria); id. at 451-52 (Nigeria); id. at
675-82 (Yemen); id. at 147-51 (Myanmar).
9 See Defendants, INT'L CRIM. COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/defendants (last visited Nov. 15, 2019)
[hereinafter ICC website - Defendants]. Five defendants were convicted of procedural offenses, such as
procuring false witness testimony. Id.
10 Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was acquitted at trial and the Appeals Chamber upheld that decision. Id. Jean-
Pierre Bemba was convicted at trial, but the Appeals Chamber overturned the conviction. Id. Laurent
Gbagbo and Charles Bl Goudd were acquitted at trial; the Prosecutor has appealed those decisions. Id.
nSee infra text accompanying notes 59-61.
12 Beth Van Schaack, International Criminal Law Roundup Series: Part I, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 6,
2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/60597/intemational-criminal-law-roundup (stating that the
Chamber's "exceptionally terse" yet "momentous" decision "dramatically departs from prior precedent"
in its standard of review and application of the command responsibility doctrine, and citing expert
consensus that the decision "will eventually be consigned to the jurisprudential scrapheap").
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obligation under the Rome Statute to execute the Court's arrest warrant. Most
other indictees remain at large. With this woeful prosecution record, other
criticisms of the Court-for its suspect focus on Africa 13 and inability to
prosecute citizens of powerful States-seem almost moot.
14
There is hope, however, and models of success. The ICC and other
international criminal tribunals have not been the only supranational institutions
working to stop mass atrocity: regional human rights commissions and courts in
the Americas, Europe, and Africa have used a variety of tools to successfully
pressure governments and, through them, non-State actors to halt abuses and
hold violators accountable. These regional institutions are the European Court of
Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. 15 During
the Cold War, when an East-West standoff precluded the creation of new
international criminal courts, the locus of supranational accountability for grave
human rights violations shifted to these regional human rights mechanisms.
These bodies have developed creative and effective methods to respond to mass
atrocity, both in real time and afterwards, that provide vital lessons for the ICC.
In this Article, we urge the International Criminal Court to evaluate, apply, and
benefit from the experience of regional bodies.
Mass atrocities have occurred frequently in the countries that the regional
bodies oversee. These commissions and courts have responded in ways that
range from behind-the-scenes pressure on States and parties to conflict, to highly
visible country visits and reports, and from the creation of special investigative
bodies to international litigation and broad reparations measures. The success of
these interventions has fostered support from citizens and elites for the regional
bodies, thus promoting a virtuous cycle that has enabled bolder engagement to
halt abuses and advance accountability. This vast regional experience with mass
atrocity-scores of interventions, both during and after atrocity and hundreds of
cases with diverse jurisprudential advances-provides the basis for the ICC to
reimagine and refocus its role and tactics.
This Article attempts to reframe and advance the debate over the value of
international criminal justice by (1) synthesizing and evaluating scholarship on
the effectiveness of the ICC (the only permanent international criminal tribunal)
and of regional human rights institutions in preventing mass atrocity and
securing criminal accountability for perpetrators; and (2) assessing the
differences between the ICC and the regional institutions to produce
" See, e.g., Zaya Yeebo, The ICC Debate: A Pan-African Perspective, PAMBAZUKA NEWS (Feb. 8,
2012), https://www.pambazuka.org/pan-africanism/icc-debate-pan-african-perspective. But see Makau
W. Mutua, Africans and the ICC: Hypocrisy, Impunity, and Perversion, in AFRICA AND THE ICC:
PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE 47 (Kamari M. Clarke et al. eds., 2016) (defending the Court).
14 See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT'L CRIM. COURT, https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en-menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%2the%2Orome%20statut
e.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
15 The African Court was created after the Cold War, in 2006. See infra note 289. A European
Commission on Human Rights operated from 1954 to 1998, in conjunction with the European Court.
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recommendations for enhancing the ICC's contribution to those two important
goals. We also offer the most complete data available on the costs of the ICC
and the regional institutions, compiled from their official reports, to compare the
institutions' efficiency.
Assessing the contribution of international legal institutions to reducing
mass atrocity and promoting criminal accountability is an exceptionally difficult
task, given the number and complexity of plausible causal connections between
the institutions' activities, on the one hand, and those two goals, on the other.16
The people who influence whether mass atrocities occur in a particular situation
include those who might commit atrocities (direct perpetrators), their families,
military superiors, political leaders, foreign supporters, the media, prosecutors,
judges, and others. All these actors' decisions are shaped by social norms and
pressures, strategic calculations, material incentives, and intra-organizational
dynamics, as well as individual psychology. The actors' thinking and incentives,
and the systemic factors that link them, change over time. We refer to this
complex system-which determines whether mass atrocities occur in a particular
situation, and on what scale-as a "causal ecosystem." 17 The determinants of
whether alleged perpetrators of atrocities axe prosecuted-the second goal of
interest to us-form a second causal ecosystem that is distinct, even though it
includes many of the same actors and forces. Evaluating how the various
activities of an international legal institution affect these causal ecosystems adds
another thick layer of analytic complexity: the institution's activities may
influence elements of the causal ecosystem determining atrocity (or the one
determining accountability) in myriad ways that increase or decrease atrocity (or
prosecution). Thus, there are many direct and indirect causal channels through
which international legal institutions could promote, or undermine, the goals on
which we focus.' 8
Scholars have not fully mapped those causal channels even at a theoretical
level, much less tested them all empirically. They have made considerable
progress, however. This Article synthesizes large bodies of scholarship on the
impact of regional human rights institutions and a smaller but growing corpus on
the impact of the ICC.
16 We have found invaluable conceptual and methodological guidance on evaluating the impact of
international human rights institutions in the work of many scholars, especially Karen Alter, Laurence
Heifer, Alexandra Huneeus, and Mikael Rask Madsen. See, e.g., Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Heifer &
Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes the Authority of international Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (2016); Alexandra Huneeus, Compliance with Judgments and Decisions, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 437 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2014).
17 A large body of social science examines the causes of atrocities in particular countries or across cases.
See, e.g., SCOTT STRAUS, THE ORDER OF GENOCIDE (2006); Peter B. Owens, Yang Su &,David A.
Snow, Social Scientific Inquiry into Genocide and Mass Killing: From Unitary Outcome to Complex
Processes, 39 ANN. REV. Soc. 69 (2013).
" See Nicole De Silva, International Courts' Socialization Strategies for Actual and Perceived
Performance, in THE PERFORMANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 288, 300-09 (Theresa
Squatrito et al. eds., 2018); Geoff Dancy & Christopher J. Fariss, Rescuing Human Rights Law from
International Legalism and its Critics, 39 HuM. RTS. Q. 1, 11-16 (2017); cf JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING
LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998)
(describing efforts to influence complex political-economic-social ecosystems).
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We fmd reasons for concern and optimism about both the ICC and the
regional institutions, although more concern about the former and more
optimism about the latter. All face daunting obstacles in reducing the incidence
of mass atrocity. None can prevent mass atrocities on its own, either across the
board or in any specific case. Mass atrocities occur when parties to conflict-or
at least those with the means to commit brutal violence-have already rejected
or exhausted less extreme methods for achieving their goals.19 International
human rights institutions do not command police or military forces that could
forcibly halt or prevent atrocities, nor wield economic sanctions that might
compel national authorities to prosecute perpetrators. Their influence depends
on their ability to change, usually only marginally, the causal ecosystems
described above.
Despite these limitations, the evidence indicates that regional human rights
institutions, and the ICC to a lesser extent, have contributed to complex
processes of political and legal change at the international level and within
particular countries that have brought perpetrators of appalling human rights
violations to justice, curtailed ongoing atrocities, and reduced their likelihood of
occurring in the future. The Inter-American and European regional institutions
have much more impact than their younger African counterparts, which also
confront more difficult political conditions. The ICC may be starting to affect
key actors' behavior in some countries after a slow beginning, reducing atrocities
and enhancing accountability. On the other hand, there is some evidence the ICC
can increase mass atrocity by exacerbating conflict or undermining
peacemaking. 20 (We have found little to suggest that regional institutions have
negative effects; at worst, they are impotent, as the ICC also can be.)
Our most provocative conclusion is that the ICC should reconceive its
strategy and overhaul its operations to act more like a regional human rights
institution. Both theory and evidence from practice show that prevention and
accountability result primarily from political and legal processes and norms
within States, sometimes catalyzed or supported by international institutions,
rather than from the actions of international bodies in isolation. Evidence
suggests these local processes tend to have more profound and durable effects,
provoke less resistance, and cost less than purely international legal processes.
The regional human rights mechanisms-especially the Inter-American
Commission and Court and the European Court-have learned to play this
complementary role with great effectiveness. Through decades of
experimentation and practice, they have devised tactics that contribute to the
political and legal dynamics that generate accountability and prevention.
The ICC, by contrast, has focused narrowly on choosing cases and
investigating, prosecuting, and judging them-and compiled a record of many
failures and few successes. While the International Criminal Court's prosecutors
19 See STUART J. KAUFMAN, MODERN HATREDS: THE SYMBOLIC POLITICS OF ETHNIC WAR 12 (2001)
(noting that ethnic politics rarely descends into ethnic war); id. at 3-12 (analyzing factors leading to
ethnic violence).
20 See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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and judges should improve their performance of these core judicial tasks, they-
along with the ICC's State Parties, who oversee and guide its priorities-also
must rethink the court's strategy for pursuing its goals. The methods developed
by the regional bodies provide invaluable guidance. We contend that the ICC
should devote less attention and fewer resources to directly investigating and
prosecuting cases and more to catalyzing and supporting actions within States-
by investigators, prosecutors, judges, executive-branch actors, and civil
society-that yield criminal accountability for perpetrators and reduce the
chances that mass atrocity will occur. The ICC has started to make such efforts,
collaborating with national actors and sometimes challenging or competing with
them--for example, by signaling that it will step in to prosecute if national
authorities fail to do so. The problem is that the ICC's judges, Prosecutor, staff,
and State Parties see these efforts as secondary to prosecuting and judging
individual cases and invest little time, attention, and other resources in them.
Reversing that priority, as we recommend, would require a significant
reallocation of resources, including personnel, funds, and management focus.
Our proposal is firmly grounded in analysis of the accomplishments,
failures, and potential of the ICC and regional institutions. Adopting it would
enhance the ICC's effectiveness in preventing atrocities and securing criminal
accountability for grave abuses. Furthermore, it is truer to the vision of the States
and civil society organizations that founded the ICC than is the court's current
strategy. The ICC was conceived as a complement to national justice systems,
not as the primary source of accountability, prevention, and compensation for
mass atrocities around the globe. Its current overemphasis on investigating,
trying, and judging, coupled with underinvestment in less visible methods of
influencing and supporting national actors, reflects a legalism that scholars have
documented and criticized in many international tribunals. The court's leaders
and staff have succumbed to a lawyerly temptation to view their role as narrowly
judicial and technical, detached from complicated, often politicized, processes
on the ground. The ICC must reconceive its place in the multilevel legal and
political realm, as a player that exercises influence through a variety of political
and legal channels and whose impact depends on its interaction with others.
Our second main recommendation -is that States and human rights
organizations reinvest in regional human rights institutions. So far, regional
institutions have been more effective than international criminal tribunals in
combatting mass atrocities and securing criminal accountability for them. They
are also dramatically less expensive. While the ICC merits continued funding by
States, especially if it adapts as we recommend, regional institutions provide
greater human rights impact at much lower cost. Each regional institution could
do far more good with just a few million dollars more per year-a tiny amount
when split among each institution's Member States. The same analysis applies
to human rights organizations. Since the 1990s, they have invested tremendous
financial, human, and political resources in international criminal tribunals; they
should devote more energy to regional institutions.
2020]
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part II acknowledges the multiple goals of
international human rights institutions and explains our focus on preventing mass
atrocities and securing criminal prosecution of their perpetrators. Part III assesses
the ICC's capacity to promote those goals, using the most significant empirical
scholarship available. Part IV does the same for the regional human rights
institutions: the Eiropean Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American
Commission and Court, and the less influential African Commission and Court.
Part V compares the impact of the two kinds of institutions, presents data on their
costs, explains how the ICC can enhance its effectiveness by shifting its strategy
and operational priorities, and makes the case for reinvesting in regional
institutions. Part VI concludes.
1I. SPECIFYING GOALS
An analysis of the effectiveness of international human rights institutions
must begin by clarifying the object of inquiry: their effectiveness at doing what?
Politicians, advocates, victims, and tribunals' own officials have argued that
international courts such as the ICC and ICTY can achieve an extraordinary
range of goals. These include assembling a historical record of unimaginable
crimes,2 1 developing international criminal law,22 helping victims heal,23
achieving justice,24 building the rule of law,25 promoting reconciliation in
polarized societies, 26 making peace between warring factions,27 and preventing
atrocities. 28 There is less discussion, but perhaps greater agreement, on the goals
of regional human rights institutions: to increase respect for the human rights
provided in the international instruments they oversee, and to secure redress for
victims of violations. 29 But regional human rights institutions supervise States'
21 See, e.g., Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovi6, Justice by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 265 (2001); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2546 n.32 (1991).
22 See, e.g., Diane Orentlicher, Review Essay: From Viability to Impact: Evolving Methods for Assessing
the International Criminal Tibunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 7 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 536,
538 (2013).
23 See, e.g., Juan Mbndez, Comments on Prosecution: Who and For What?, in DEALING WITH THE PAST:
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 87, 90 (Alex Boraine et al. eds., 1994) (arguing that
"prosecution itself will provide a measure of healing and show the victims that their plight has not been
forgotten by the state and society"). But see Jamie O'Connell, Gambling with the Psyche: Does
Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console Their Victims?, 46 HARv. INT'L L.J. 295 (2005)
(documenting that evidence to support such claims is minimal).
24 See, e.g., Richard Dicker & Elise Keppler, Beyond The Hague: The Challenges of International
Justice, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004 194 (Human Rights Watch ed., 2004)
(equating justice with prosecution).
2 See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Introduction, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND PRACTICE 3, 4 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995).
26 See, e.g., Ivkovid, supra note 21, at 334.
27 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, preamble.
28 See, e.g., id.
29 See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights pmbl., Jun. 9, 1998, OAU Dc.
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT(II) [hereinafter Protocol to the African Charter] ("[T]he attainment
of the objectives of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights requires the establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights ... "); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
art. 30, Jun. 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter African Charter] ("An African Commission on
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protection of the full panoply of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights. Further complicating the potential analytic task, some 150 countries and
decades of events fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC or regional human rights
institutions. Evaluating the effectiveness of multiple institutions in promoting all
possible goals, in relation to all crimes and human rights violations within their
purviews, and across their full geographic and temporal jurisdictions, would be
an enormous task.
We focus our analysis on the atrocious acts that fall within the jurisdictions
of both international criminal courts and regional institutions: mass atrocities
involving physical violence or confinement-including killings of civilians,
widespread torture, mutilation, forced disappearances, and arbitrary detention-
against large numbers of people. Such mass atrocities are usually committed by
repressive regimes and/or during armed conflict and are sometimes referred to
as "gross" or "massive" human rights violations. 30 These acts generally
constitute genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes, and thus fall
within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC. 31 They also violate human
rights that all regional institutions are empowered to protect, including the rights
to life, bodily integrity, and freedom from torture. We are interested in the cases
described by David Scheffer as constituting "atrocity crimes": those in which
these acts are "widespread or systematic or occu[r] as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes" and were "led, in [their] execution, by a ruling or
otherwise powerful elite in society (including rebel or terrorist leaders). 32 We
use the terms "atrocity crimes" and "mass atrocity" interchangeably, and in
relation to both criminal justice through the ICC and civil processes in regional
institutions. 33
We further focus our analysis by examining the capacity of the ICC and
regional institutions to advance just two of the many goals posited for them:
ensuring accountability through criminal prosecution for atrocity crimes, and
reducing their incidence in the future, in both current and future conflicts, which
Human and Peoples' Rights... shall be estabished... to promote human and peoples' rights and
ensure their protection in Africa."); Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights art. 1, Oct. 31,
1979, O.A.S. AG/RES. 448 (IX-0/79) ("The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is an autonomous
judicial institution whose purpose is the application and interpretation of the American Convention on
Human Rights."); American Convention on Human Rights art. 41, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123, [hereinafter American Convention] ("The main function of the [Inter-American]
Commission shall be to promote respect for and defense of human rights."); Convention for the
Protection Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 19, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter European Convention] ("To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the
High Contracting Parties.. there shall be set up a European Court of Human Rights .... ").
3 See Sebastian RAduletu, National Prosecutions as the Main Remedy in Cases of Massive Human
Rights Violations: An Assessment of the Approach of the European Court of Human Rights, 9 INT'L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 449,450 (2015).
" See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5 (specifying that the court has jurisdiction over crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes).
32 See David Scheffer, Genocide andAtrocity Crimes, 1 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 229, 238-39
(2006).
" Our focus on this subset of human rights violations reflects a methodological imperative rather than a
value judgment.
2020]
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we also refer to as "preventing. ' 34 The institutions may advance or retard these
goals directly or indirectly by affecting the complex interactions of many
actors-the causal ecosystems-that determine whether the atrocities occur or
(separately) whether perpetrators are held accountable. While the existing
literature discusses all the goals of criminal tribunals and regional institutions
listed above, scholars have devoted most attention to these two. Prevention is
arguably the most important purpose of both the ICC and regional human rights
institutions: victims who survive mass atrocities are often traumatized
irreparably, 35 and social fabrics and political institutions take decades to
recover.36 Furthermore, the creators and leaders of the institutions themselves
have cited preventing atrocities as their most important purpose, or one of a
preeminent few. The Preamble to the Rome Statute of the ICC highlights the
framing States' "determin[ation] to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators
of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes."37 The
ICC Prosecutor's 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations affirmed that
"the goal of the Rome Statute" is to "contribute to th[e] prevention" of "the most
serious crimes of international concern," by "put[ting] an end to impunity. '38 For
regional institutions, preventing human rights violations, including atrocity
crimes, is inherent in the primary purpose of the conventions they enforce: to
"secure to everyone within [the] jurisdiction [of the State Parties] the rights and
freedoms" that the conventions define.
39
Securing criminal accountability for perpetrators of mass atrocities, whether
in national or international courts, is one of the most common demands of
victims of mass atrocities and their families. Many victims, activists, and
philosophers believe that justice requires prosecution and punishment of
perpetrators of these crimes. Criminal justice also may contribute to prevention,
for example by incapacitating and delegitimizing those who have already
committed atrocities and might otherwise do so again, deterring potential
perpetrators, bolstering norms against those crimes, and strengthening the social,
political, and legal consequences of violating such norms.
4 0
14 "Conflicts" here is a shorthand for situations in which mass atrocities may occur; while all of these
involve some sort of conflict, not all involve violent conflict such as civil war--dictatorships facing
purely peaceful resistance may commit mass torture, for example.
" See O'Connell, supra note 23, at 306-16 (surveying the psychological impact on victims of atrocities
such as extrajudicial killing, torture, and disappearance).
36 See Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein, Conclusion: A Common Objective, A Universe of
Alternatives, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS
ATROCITY 323, 323-39 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004).
37 Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. The Preamble also implies that punishing the crimes might
promote peace.
11 The Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, INT'L CRIM. COURT (Nov.
2013) at 5 ( 22), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-
PolicyPaper Preliminary Examinations2013-ENG.pdf (emphasis added) [hereinafter Policy Paper on
Preliminary Examinations].
31 European Convention, supra note 29, art 1; accordAmerican Convention, supra note 29, art. 1(1);
African Charter, supra note 29, art. 1.
" Although criminal prosecution of perpetrators of mass atrocities-at least the political leaders and
commanders who plan and order them-is valuable in many cases, human rights activists have
sometimes overemphasized it, with a variety of unfortunate consequences. See generally ANTI-
IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA (Karen Engle et al. eds., 2016). The overinvestment in the
ICC compared to regional institutions, which we recommend redressing, reflects a related bias.
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Those two goals-securing accountability and preventing atrocities-are
related to each other and also connected with other goals on which we do not
focus. Our analysis does incorporate evidence on how the ICC and regional
institutions contribute to or undermine other goals-such as ending civil war-
to the extent that these other goals serve as a means towards accountability or
prevention.
IlI. THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT
Human rights organizations, their funders, and friendly governments
invested tremendous time and political capital throughout the 1990s to create the
International Criminal Court. Sixty States quickly ratified the Rome Statute after
its completion in 1998, and it entered into force in 2002, bringing the Court into
existence. 41 (As of late 2019, 122 States are members. 42) Within a year, the ICC's
first Prosecutor and judges were working to build an institution capable of
investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating the most heinous and complex
crimes recognized by the international community.
The Rome Statute establishes the Court's powers and basic procedures. It
can prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes. 43 Importantly for our analysis, the ICC is intended to be secondary to
national court systems, possessing only "complementary" jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute crimes only when States are "unable" or "unwilling"
to do so themselves. 44 The Court also is limited to prosecuting crimes committed
on the territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute, by a national of a State Party,
or in a situation that has been referred to the Court by the UN Security Council.4 5
It is constrained by no statute of limitations, and heads of State and other State
officials have no immunity from indictment, arrest, or prosecution.46
The Court's formal engagement with a particular "situation"-a conflict or
country-begins when the Prosecutor opens a "preliminary examination" to
determine whether crimes within the Court's jurisdiction occurred.4 7
41 References to "the Court" in this Part refer to the ICC.
42 See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT'L CRIM. COURT, https:/asp.icc-
cpi.int/en-menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%2to%20the%20rome%20statut
e.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
43 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(1). Since 2018, it can also charge and prosecute the "crime of
aggression," but it has not done so yet. See id. art. 5(2); Alex Whiting, Crime ofAggression Activated at
the ICC: Does it Matter?, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/49859/crime-
aggression-activated-icc-matter/. Since the crime of aggression-which involves "the use of armed
force" by one State against another in a "manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations"---
does not necessarily involve mass atrocities, it is irrelevant to the analysis in this article. Rome Statute,
supra note 1, art. 8 bis.
"Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1).
Id. arts. 12, 13(b).
4' Id. arts. 27, 29.
4' The Prosecutor's office states that it conducts preliminary examinations similarly regardless of
whether it is taking on the situation on its own initiative (proprio motu) or the UN Security Council or a
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Investigators generally travel to the country to interview victims, witnesses, and
sometimes suspects. They may visit crime sites and gather physical evidence.
They also determine whether any national judicial system is investigating and
prosecuting the crimes adequately; if so, the complementarity principle makes
those cases inadmissible at the ICC. The Prosecutor can end the preliminary
examination without bringing any cases. Alternatively, he or she can upgrade the
situation to an "investigation," begin assembling cases against individual
suspects, and eventually indict.48 A trial occurs only if the Court gains custody
of the indictee. Importantly for our analysis, the Prosecutor has wide latitude on
when, as well as whether, to move from preliminary examination to
investigation. That step sometimes takes months, but in Colombia the Prosecutor
has continued the preliminary examination for fifteen years,49 using the implicit
threat of a shift to investigation and prosecutions to influence the Colombian
peace process, as discussed below.
50
The ICC's effectiveness in promoting the goals on which we focus has been
hotly disputed. Politicians, activists, and analysts have criticized it with
increasing vehemence for indicting too few defendants too slowly, 51 picking
fights with powerful defendants who defy the Court,52 overemphasizing crimes
committed in Africa,53 and deferring to powerful States such as the United
States.54 On the other hand, many activists see the Court as central to their efforts
to reduce violations of the most fundamental human rights.
55
What does the evidence show? This Part examines the ICC's contribution to
date to efforts to prevent and-through its own trials and those in national
courts-secure criminal accountability for mass atrocity. Rigorous research has
only begun to appear, but it is sufficient to move our analysis beyond the
speculation that has proliferated since the 1990s. As noted in Part I, international
legal institutions may affect mass atrocity and accountability through numerous
court member has referred the case to the Court. See David Bosco, Discretion and State Influence at the
International Criminal Court: The Prosecutor's Preliminary Examinations, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. 395,
399 (2017). Bosco argues, however, that preliminary examinations after referrals are "tilted sharply
toward opening a full investigation," id. at 395, and his data suggest preliminary examinations of
situations referred by a State Party or the Security Council are much shorter than those initiated by the
Prosecutor proprio motu, id. at 400-401.
" The ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber must confirm the upgrade to an investigation if the Prosecutor took on
the situation proprio motu. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15.
49 Sara Wharton & Rosemary Grey, The Full Picture: Preliminary Examinations at the International
Criminal Court, 2018 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. (online version) 1,41-42.
o See infra Section III.C.
5 See, e.g., David Davenport, International Criminal Court: 12 Years, $1 Billion, 2 Convictions,
FORBES (Mar. 12, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2014/03/12/international-
criminal-court- 12-years- 1-billion-2-convictions-2/#7c5ada092405.
52 See, e.g., Marlise Simons, South Africa Should have Arrested Sudan's President, ICC Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (July 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/world/africalicc-south-africa-sudan-
bashir.htmil; Alastair Leithad, Dismissal of Case Against Kenya's Ruto Huge Blow to ICC, BBC (Apr. 5,
2016), https://www.bbc.con/news/world-africa-35974172.
" See Yeebo, supra note 13.
54 See DAvID BosCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A WORLD OF POWER
POLITICS (2014).
" See, e.g., ICC: Strengthen Court on 20th Anniversary, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 16,2018),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/16/icc-strengthen-court-20th-anniversary.
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direct and indirect causal channels. The number and complexity of those
channels may explain why no scholar has comprehensively theorized, let alone
evaluated, all the ways in which the ICC might shape the causal ecosystems that
determine the incidence of atrocity and legal accountability, although many
valuable works have examined some connections. 56 This Part takes a pragmatic
approach, examining only those channels that have been studied. empirically,
using quantitative or qualitative methods.
We begin, in Section A, with a single, straightforward way in which the ICC
promotes one of our goals: generating criminal accountability for mass atrocity
directly, by itself investigating and prosecuting perpetrators. Section B performs
a more complicated task, evaluating the evidence on how ICC investigations and
prosecutions of individual cases affect, through various possible causal
mechanisms, both goals-increasing prosecutions, now considering only those
in national courts, and reducing the incidence of mass atrocity. Section C
considers how Court activities other than building cases and prosecuting
individual cases-including preliminary examinations-may influence
accountability, again in national courts specifically, and atrocity levels.
The last two Sections yield a surprising conclusion: the ICC's greatest
potential impact is indirect, through its support of and pressure on national-level
actors who gather evidence of crimes, prosecute perpetrators in national courts,
and punish them at the domestic level, and other contributions to dynamics that
reduce atrocity or increase accountability. Less promising is the Court's
conventional judicial work of direct investigation and prosecution of particular
perpetrators. Its indirect exercise of influence resembles the process by which
regional human rights systems work, and matches the philosophy of
complementarity that guided the ICC's creators.
A. Direct Prosecution: Criminal Accountability at the ICC
In theory, the ICC has the power to achieve one of the goals of concern to
us, criminal accountability, directly-by prosecuting perpetrators of mass
atrocity itself. In practice, the Court has barely advanced accountability through
its own cases. In over seventeen years, it has acquitted as many defendants of
mass atrocities as it has convicted-four each. 57 This record might be reasonable
in a national court, but international courts can try only a few defendants from
among thousands of perpetrators of atrocities under their jurisdiction. Their
complex, multi-year trials cost tens of millions of dollars each, and impose
enormous burdens on victims, witnesses, and defendants.
6 See, e.g., Kate Cronin-Furman, Managing Expectations: International Criminal Trials and the
Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity, 7 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 434, 442 (2013); Hyeran Jo
& Beth Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?, 70 INT'L ORG. 443 (2016). All
of the empirical studies discussed below also explain the theory behind their findings, and many
helpfully summarize theories of ICC impact beyond those they test.
" See ICC website - Defendants, supra note 9.
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ICC prosecutors seem to have departed from their colleagues' practice of
bringing only cases with exceptionally solid factual and legal bases. Their fifty
percent conviction rate is far lower than those of their international predecessors.
The first Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, David Crane,
stated in 2003 that he brought only cases he was confident he could prove beyond
a reasonable doubt.58 His record backs up that claim: the Special Court convicted
all defendants against whom it rendered final verdicts.59 The Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have convicted three defendants and
acquitted none.60 The ICTY and ICTR, with more defendants, acquitted some,
but their conviction-to-acquittal aggregates, at 90:18 (83% convicted) and 61:14
(81% convicted), are far better than the ICC's 4:4 (50% convicted).61
A criminal court can enhance accountability even without convicting, to be
sure: ICC defendants are generally imprisoned during trial, a significant
deprivation even if they are eventually acquitted. Even those who never face the
Court could lose time, money, reputation, and opportunities due to their
indictment and efforts to avoid capture. But the ICC has done little to promote
accountability in these ways. In the seventeen years since the Rome Statute
entered into force, the Prosecutor has indicted only thirty-seven people for mass
atrocities, including the four who have been convicted.62 Just four more are in
ICC custody, on or awaiting trial.63 The other twenty-nine indictees include the
four who were acquitted.64 Cases against eight collapsed and were withdrawn by
the Prosecutor or dismissed by the judges, including those against the now-
President and Vice President of Kenya.65 One was closed because the
defendant-Abdullah Al-Senussi-was being tried by a national court.6 6 Five
58 Sierra Leone News, THE SIERRA LEONE WEB (May 29, 2003), http://www.sierra-
leone.org/Archives/slnews05O3.html.
5 9 
Homepage, SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE: RESIDUAL SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE,
http://rscsl.org/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2019). The investigations and indictments of all defendants the
Special Court tried for mass atrocities (rather than procedural offenses such as witness tampering)
occurred during Crane's term, even though most of the trials took place under his successors, See Office
of the Prosecutor, SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE: RESIDUAL SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE,
http://rscsl.org/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2019); Charles Chemor Jalloh, Special Court for Sierra Leone:
Achieving Justice, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 395, 405-12 (2011).
6o Case Load, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS CTS. CAMBODIA, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case-load
(last visited Nov. 15, 2019).6 1 Key Figures of Cases, U.N. INT'L RESIDUAL MECHANISM FOR CRIM. TRIBUNALS,
http://unictr.irmct.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases (last updated Oct. 2019) (detailing figures for the
ICTR); Key Figures of the Cases, INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases (last updated Aug. 2019) (detailing figures for the
ICTY).
62 See ICC website - Defendants, supra note 9. Seven others have been charged only with crimes against
the administration ofjustice, such as witness tampering. Id.
63 The four are Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz, Alfred Yekatom, Patrice-Edouard Ngalssona, and Dominic
Ongwen. Id.
6 Id.
65 Charges against Bahar Abu Garda, Callixte Mbarushimana, Mohamed Ali, Henry Kosgey, William
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indictees have died without facing trial.67 The ICC has been unable to apprehend
the remaining eleven.
68
Trials for international crimes are necessarily more complex and time-
consuming than ordinary criminal cases such as murder or battery. But the ICC,
like the ICTY, ICTR, and other recent international criminal courts, has slowed
justice significantly: trials alone take three years or more, and the single level of
appeal often takes years more. By contrast, the Argentine courts took twenty-one
months to try, convict, sentence, and decide the appeals of the military juntas
responsible for crimes against humanity from 1976 to 1983.69
The twelve indictees who have defeated the ICC, and sixteen more who have
avoided capture, may have suffered some inconvenience. 70 But the Prosecutor
and judges have undermined the Court's authority, respectively by choosing
losing battles and by inexplicably ruling for defendants. The Court's failures
include its highest profile cases. Lord's Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony,
indicted for crimes against humanity and war crimes in 2005, remains at large.7 1
Omar Al Bashir remained President of Sudan for ten years despite an outstanding
ICC arrest warrant for genocide and crimes against humanity, and Kenya and
South Africa hosted him in defiance of their obligation to enforce the ICC
72warrant. Kenyan politicians Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto waged a
vigorous struggle against the ICC in African Union (AU) diplomatic fora and at
home in Kenya after the ICC indicted them for crimes against humanity. They
succeeded, persuading the AU to condemn the ICC and their fellow citizens to
elect them President and Vice President of Kenya. 73 The ICC's cases against
them collapsed after witnesses withdrew amid reported intimidation.
74
While the Court cannot be blamed for lacking a military force that might
arrest indictees, its prosecutors could prioritize investigating and indicting
offenders whom they have a reasonable chance of capturing and convicting. To
be sure, the ICC must strike a balance between taking on intractable situations
that have defied all other accountability mechanisms yet merit international
concern, on the one hand, and securing accountability and building its own
67 The deceased are Sylvestre Mudacumura, Raska Lukwiya, Muammar Gaddafi, Saleh Jerbo, and Okot
Odhiambo. Id. Mudacumura died in September 2019. See DR Congo: Warlord Sought by ICC Killed,
HUM. RTs. WATCH (Sept. 20,2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/20/dr-congo-warlord-sought-
icc-killed. The ICC has not yet dismissed the case against him. See ICC website - Defendants, supra
note 9.
68 These individuals are SaifGaddafi, Simone Gbagbo, Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled, Joseph Kony, Ali
Kushayb, Mahmoud al-Werfalli, Omar Al Bashir, Ahmad Harun, Abdel Raheem Hussein, Abdallah
Banda, and Vincent Otti. Id.69 See THOMAS C. WRIGHT, STATE TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA: CHILE, ARGENTINA, AND
INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS 148-50 (2007); Supreme Court ofArgentina, Buenos Aires: Judgment
of December 30, 1986, 3 TRANsrrIONAL JUSTICE 500, 500-03 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
71 ICC website - Defendants, supra note 9.
7' Kony et al. Case, INT'L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/kony (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
72 See Yvonne M. Dutton & Tessa Alleblas, Unpacking the Deterrent Effect of the International
Criminal Court: Lessons from Kenya, 91 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 105, 123 (2017).
71 See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne Elizabeth Showalter, Opposing International Justice: Kenya's
Integrated Backlash Strategy Against the ICC, 17 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2017).
7' Dutton & Alleblas, supra note 72, at 158, 161-62, 169-70.
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authority to facilitate future prosecutions, on the other. In our view, the Court
has, overestimated its power, underestimated the importance of success, or both.
Thus, looking only at the most direct channel by which the ICC advances one of
the goals that concern us, the Court has had little impact: its own investigations
and trials have provided very little criminal accountability for mass atrocities.
We now turn to evidence on whether its cases help prevent atrocities or promote
accountability less directly.
B. The Impact of ICC Cases on Atrocities and National-Level
Accountability
Numerous plausible theories suggest that the ICC's indictment and
prosecution of individual defendants could, through various causal paths,
decrease or increase mass atrocity or prosecutions in national courts. This
Section summarizes what we know about the reality, by synthesizing empirical
scholarship. The significant, though limited, universe of studies relevant to the
first goal yields contradictory findings: some suggest that ICC indictments and
prosecutions reduce atrocities, while others indicate that its judicial activity leads
to more crimes. There is less evidence on how ICC cases affect national-level
prosecutions; one cross-national, quantitative study finds a positive effect, but
several book-length studies of the ICC's involvement in particularcountries find
that individual cases neither stimulated nor undermined national-level
accountability.
There is some evidence that ICC prosecutions can shape conflict dynamics
in ways that reduce atrocities. Political scientist Michael Broache interviewed
rebel soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and combined their
observations with reporting and analysis by the United Nations, media, and
experts.75 Both groups that Broache studied routinely committed mass atrocities
such as massacres of civilians. Broache finds that the arrests in 2009 and 2010
of leaders of the Forces Ddmocratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), based
on warrants issued by the ICC and German courts, seriously weakened the
group.76 Fundraising in Europe dried up.7 7 A FDLR officer "reported that these
arrests created a leadership vacuum [in the DRC] that undermined the FDLR's
ability to organize operations, including attacks against civilians." 78 The loss of
international support undermined combatant morale, triggering desertions.
79
Broache's study of a second rebel group, the Congr~s National Pour la Ddfense
du Peuple/Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23), found that M23 leader Bosco
Ntaganda's surrender to the ICC "undermin[ed] group morale, prompt[ed]
massive defections and depriv[ed] M23 of access to critical financial and
7 Michael Broache, International Prosecutions and Atrocities in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A
Case Study of the FDLR, 7 J. MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA 19, 25-28 (2016) [hereinafter Broache,
International Prosecutions and Atrocities].
76 Id. at 32-34.
" Id. at 32-33.71 Id. at 33.
71 Id. at 33-34.
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recruitment networks, while also generating deterrence vis-a-vis some
combatants who feared future legal sanctions as a result of Ntaganda's
surrender." 80 Broache's research indicates that specific ICC cases-against
FDLR and M23 commanders-served to diminish those rebel movements'
military capacity, and thus may have reduced their activity and perhaps their
victimization of civilians.
Several other studies also conclude that ICC cases can reduce atrocities, but
their evidence is thin and inconclusive. The Court issued arrest warrants for
atrocities during the Libyan civil war on a single day; Courtney Hillebrecht finds
that violence against civilians was lower than other variables would predict
exactly seven days later, although not the day after.81 Based on interviews with
activists, politicians, journalists, and others, Yvonne Dutton and Tessa Alleblas
attribute the low level of violence around Kenya's 2013 election to the ICC's
having indicted two leading candidates, Kenyatta and Ruto, for atrocities after
the 2007 election.82 When they appeared voluntarily at a preliminary hearing, the
ICC trial judge warned them she would order their arrest if they incited
violence.83 Kenyatta and Ruto repeatedly called for peace during the subsequent
campaign.
84
There is strong evidence that the ICC reduced mass atrocities globally during
its first decade. Hyeran Jo and Beth Simmons analyze data on intentional killing
of civilians between 1989 and 2011 by government forces and rebels in 101
countries. They control for variables including type of government, existence of
a civil war, quality of domestic judicial institutions, foreign aid receipts, and
activity by human rights organizations. Looking across all countries in their
sample, including those in which the ICC was involved and those in which it was
not, Jo and Simmons find that more ICC activity reduced civilian killings during
the period studied. Specifically, when other factors were held constant, an
increase by one in the number of new ICC preliminary examinations,
investigations, or arrest warrants over a three-year period coincided with a
decrease in the number of civilians killed by government forces the next year by
43% and the number killed by rebels by 17%. 85 This finding provides evidence
that the ICC has reduced atrocities, although the authors do not prove causation.
It is not clear, however, whether the possible life-saving effect could have
flowed from the ICC's investigation and prosecution of individual cases
(considered in this Section) or from other sources, such as the possibility it would
act (considered in the next Section). Jo and Simmons's measure of ICC activity
0 Michael Broache, Irrelevance, Instigation, and Prevention: The Mixed Effects of International
Criminal Court Prosecutions on Atrocities in the CNDP/M23 Case, 10 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST.
388,405 (2016) [hereinafter Broache, Irrelevance, Instigation and Prevention].
" See Courtney Hillebrecht, The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court: Evidence from
Libya, 42 INT'L INTERACTIONS 616, 633-34 (2016). Many massacres occurred after the warrants were
issued. Wierda, supra note 7, at 58.
82 Dutton & Alleblas, supra note 72, at 157-59.
" Id. at 159.84 
Id.
" Jo & Simmons, supra note 56, at 460, 468.
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combines two variables that reflect the Court's individual cases (i.e., moving
situations into the investigation stage and issuing arrest warrants) with one that
does not (launching new preliminary examinations).86 Because the authors
analyze the relationship between killing and a single variable that measures all
ICC activities, it is possible that the reduction in killing they find is connected to
individual prosecutions, other activities, or both.
Unfortunately, the reduction in mass atrocity that Jo and Simmons identify
may be limited to the period up to 2011, when the ICC appeared more powerful
than it does now. They theorize that their finding reflects potential perpetrators'
fear of the Court-presumably that the ICC would inflict costs on them by
indicting or, worse, apprehending and trying or, worse still, convicting and
imprisoning them. In the period Jo and Simmons studied, through 2011,
however, potential perpetrators may have feared the ICC much more than they
do now. The ICC's four acquittals and the collapse of the Kenya cases have all
occurred since 2011. During this period, the Court has continued to fail to
apprehend most indictees, including the highest profile defendants. Literature on
ordinary crime finds that potential criminals' beliefs about likelihood of
punishment shape their behavior more than their beliefs about severity of
punishment.87 Considering the number of Rome Statute crimes committed since
2002, the probability of any particular perpetrator facing justice in The Hague is
extremely small. However clear that was before 2011, the ICC's weak record in
investigating and prosecuting individual cases since then may have diminished
the deterrent effect that Jo and Simmons's research suggests.
There is also some evidence that ICC prosecutions actually increase
atrocities-although this, too, is far from conclusive. Broache's studies of FDLR
and M23 report "suggestive evidence" that the 2012 ICC arrest warrant for the
FDLR's supreme military commander, Sylvestre Mudacumura, "strengthened
Mudacumura's opposition to peace initiatives and, in doing so, indirectly
contributed to the uptick in violence beginning in mid-2014."'88 A former M23
member told Broache that after the ICC convicted Thomas Lubanga in 2012,
M23 leader Bosco Ntaganda, a Lubanga prot~gd, "began to have some fear of
the ICC."' 89 Broache believes Ntaganda's fear that the DRC government would
turn him over to the Court caused him to form M23, which immediately
committed atrocities against civilians. 90 Alyssa Prorok's quantitative study uses
data on all civil wars between 2002 and 2013. After controlling for factors such
as country size, type of government, and rebel military strength, she finds that
conflicts connected with an ICC investigation or preliminary examination had
an 11% chance of ending in a particular year, compared to a 21% chance for
those in which the ICC was not active.91 However, Prorok acknowledges that
6 Id. at 457-58 (defining ICC ACTIONS variable).
87 See Hunjoon Kim & Kathryn Sikkink, Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights
Prosecutions for Transitional Countries, 54 INT'L STUD. Q. 939, 943 (2010).
88 Broache, International Prosecutions andAtrocities, supra note 75, at 34-35.
89 Broache, Irrelevance, Instigation and Prevention, supra note 80, at 399, 404.
9 I1d.
9' Alyssa Prorok, The (In) Compatibility of Peace and Justice? The International Criminal Court and
Civil Conflict Termination, 71 INT'L ORG. 213, 228-30 (2017).
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this finding does not prove that the ICC inhibits peacemaking-the Court may
take on the very civil wars that are most difficult to end, rather than making those
it addresses more intractable.9 2 Furthermore, Prorok's results are contradicted by
a subsequent quantitative study, by Geoff Dancy and Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm,
which finds no connection between international or domestic trials and the
likelihood that conflict will end.93
Five in-depth scholarly studies of the ICC's cases against Joseph Kony and
other commanders of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) support competing
views of the possible deterrent (or inflammatory) impact of ICC cases on mass
atrocity. On the one hand, several conclude that the July 2005 LRA indictments
contributed to the group's international isolation, including Sudan's withdrawal
of support.9 4 Over the following years, LRA fighters left the group and returned
to civilian life. The rump LRA retreated into Congo and the Central African
Republic. While it still attacks civilians there, its smaller size may make it less
of a threat and it no longer operates in Uganda, where it wreaked havoc for years.
The ICC thus may have helped reduce LRA atrocities. On the other hand, nearly
all of these scholars agree that the indictments contributed to the failure in 2008
of peace talks with the Ugandan government in Juba, which might have led to
the group's complete demobilization. Most specifically, they believe that Kony
rejected a peace agreement laboriously crafted by his own negotiators and the
government, because it did not sufficiently protect him from the ICC. 9 5 Some
see the indictments as having created a general mistrust that the talks never
overcame.
96
If the evidence is thin, inconclusive, and ambiguous about whether ICC
investigation and prosecution of specific defendants significantly decreases or
increases atrocities, then do its cases at least promote the other goal of concern
to us, criminal accountability, by increasing prosecutions at the national level?
The evidence on this goal is too modest to suggest even a tentative conclusion.
Geoff Dancy and Florencia Montal's multivariate analysis of fifty-one African
9See id. at 233-39.
93 Geoff Dancy & Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, The Impact of Criminal Prosecutions During Intrastate
Conflict, 55 J. PEACE RESEARCH 47, 56 (2018); see also Geoff Dancy & Florencia Montal, From Law
Versus Politics to Law In Politics: A Pragmatist Assessment of the ICC's Impact, 32 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 645,670 (2016) [hereinafter Dancy & Montal, From Law Versus Politics] (stating that their
research found "no significant correlation between ICC involvement [in conflicts] and the end of
fighting" but providing no detail on methods).94 See MARK KERSTEN, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT: THE EFFECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT'S INTERVENTIONS ON ENDING WARS AND BUILDING PEACE 80 (2016); PATRICK S. WEGNER,
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN ONGOING INTRASTATE CONFLICTS 269-70 (2015); Hyeran
Jo, Michell Radtke & Beth Simmons, Assessing the International Criminal Court, in THE
PERFORMANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 193, 214 (Therese Squatrito et al. eds.,
2018).
95 See LINE ENGBO GISSEL, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND PEACE PROCESSES IN AFRICA:
JUDICIALIZING PEACE 61 (2018); KERSTEN, supra note 94, at 114 (reporting this as the "mainstream
understanding"); SARAH M.H. NOUWEN, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE CATALYZING
EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA AND SUDAN 136 (2013); WEGNER,
supra note 94, at 271.
96 Julia Reilly, The Prosecution Paradox: How the International Criminal Court Affects Civil War Peace
Negotiations 102-35 (July 2019) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nebraska),
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscitheses/52/.
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countries finds that those in which the ICC is conducting a full-fledged
investigation-having issued indictments or being on the verge of doing so-
prosecuted significantly more government agents for violations of physical
integrity rights between 1970 and 2014 than other African countries. 97 They find,
by contrast, that preliminary examinations, which focus on the situation as a
whole rather than individual cases, had no effect on domestic prosecution
activity.98 This influence was not overwhelming, however, and other research
emphasizes the weakness of any national-level effects of ICC cases. Several in-
depth case studies of Sudan find the ICC's involvement has not increased
prosecution of mass atrocities there.99 Analyses of Uganda, where the Court has
indicted only rebels, not government agents, find at best modest impact. They
attribute what little impact the Court has had not to its individual cases-its
indictments of LRA commanders and ongoing trial of one-but to its broader
engagement with the government, media, and civil society.'00
To summarize, the available evidence suggests that the ICC's investigation
and prosecution of individual cases sometimes affects conflict dynamics and thus
atrocities, but can cut either way, reducing or exacerbating them. Jo and
Simmons associate greater ICC activity with significantly less killing of civilians
by government and rebel forces, but it is not clear whether this might stem from
individual prosecutions, which this Section has examined, or from the shadow
of the ICC's attention or other ICC actions, considered in the next Section.
Furthermore, the Court's impotence against individual defendants, apprehending
few indictees and acquitting half those it has tried, raises serious doubts that it
can realize the potential of individual indictments and prosecutions. There is as
yet insufficient evidence to assess the impact of ICC cases on prosecution of
perpetrators of mass atrocity by national courts.
C. Complement and Catalyst: The Potential of Indirect
Influence
The ICC's first Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, recognized as early as
2003 that the Court could contribute to legal accountability through actions other
than investigating and prosecuting individual cases.' 0 1 His successor, Fatou
Bensouda, believes those actions can help prevent atrocities as well: during
97 Geoff Dancy & Florencia Montal, Unintended Positive Complementarity: Why International Criminal
Court Investigations May Increase Domestic Human Rights Prosecutions, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. 689, 711
(2017) [hereinafter Dancy & Montal, Unintended Positive Complementarlty]. The violations of physical
integrity rights on which they focus include torture, political imprisonment, disappearance, unlawful
killing, and sexual abuse. Id. at 703. These are similar in nature, although not necessarily scale, to what
we term mass atrocities. In a different article, the same authors argue that ICC investigations in the
Uganda and DRC, specifically, increased prosecutions there, but this is a more geographically limited
claim and they offer less compelling quantitative support than in Unintended Positive Complementarity.
Dancy & Montal, From Law Versus Politics, supra note 93, at 698.
" Dancy & Montal, Unintended Positive Complementarity, supra note 97, at 709.
99 See NOUWEN, supra note 95, at 321-28; WEGNER, supra note 94, at 91.
100 See infra text accompanying notes 116-117.
... The Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, INT'L
CRIM. COURT (Sept. 2003) at 5.
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preliminary examinations, in addition to considering whether to proceed to
investigation stage,
the Office [of the Prosecutor] also seeks to contribute to two
overarching goals of the Statute: the ending of impunity, by
encouraging genuine national proceedings, and the prevention
of crimes, thereby potentially obviating the need for the Court's
intervention. 1
0 2
Actions and statements by prosecutors and judges unrelated to individual
cases, as well as the Court's very existence and its jurisdiction on the territory of
Member States, could shape the interests, expectations, and tactics of politicians,
military commanders, rank-and-file fighters, national judges and prosecutors,
activists, the media, and other relevant actors. Their interactions in national and
international arenas make up the causal ecosystems that determine whether
atrocities occur and whether perpetrators are held accountable. Despite Moreno
Ocampo's and Bensouda's words, however, they, their staff, and the ICC's
judges have focused overwhelmingly on investigating and prosecuting
individual cases. Except in Colombia, they have devoted little energy and few
resources to stimulating and supporting accountability in national courts or
trying to reduce atrocities.
Scholars have recognized these indirect channels of possible influence, but
few have examined them rigorously. "[E]mpirical work ... tends to
operationalize ICC involvement in a situation only as formal prosecution, or
perhaps slightly more broadly as formal investigation."'1 3 Nonetheless,
emerging evidence strongly suggests that ICC prosecutors, and perhaps judges,
can act in ways that shift the ecosystems driving atrocities and national-level
prosecutions, decreasing the former and increasing the latter. Those actions
include supporting, educating, and pressuring national actors.
Subsection 1 musters the evidence on the ICC's impact on atrocities and
national-level prosecutions through efforts beyond investigating and prosecuting
its own cases. Subsection 2 describes the ICC's lack of investment in such
approaches. Subsection 3 examines the ICC's involvement in efforts to end the
civil war in Colombia. That case study illustrates the complexity of the Court's
channels of influence and how it can contribute to conflict resolution (thus
averting atrocities) and accountability through persistent, strategic engagement.
1. Evidence of Potential
Several quantitative studies suggest that the mere possibility that the ICC
might intervene in a particular situation may shift the atrocities ecosystem in
102 The Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities: 2018, INT'L CRIM.
COURT (Dec. 2018) at 8 [hereinafter Report on Preliminary Examination Activities: 2018].
103 Reilly, supra note 96, at 14; see also Courtney Hillebrecht & Alexandra Huneeus, The Judicialization
ofPeace, 59 HARV. INT'L L.J. 279, 287 (2018).
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ways that reduce suffering. All of these studies apply regression analysis to large
statistical samples and control for other factors that could influence their
dependent variables. In addition to the findings discussed previously, Jo and
Simmons find that the governments of ICC members killed, on average, 47%
fewer civilians than those of non-Member States.10 4 Benjamin Appel finds a
statistically significant drop in mass atrocities within States that ratified the
Rome Statute from before ratification to after.1 °5 Prorok also finds that ICC
Member States are more successful at ending civil wars than non-members;
ending conflict likely reduces both motivation and opportunity for government
forces and their opponents to commit atrocities.1 °6 Beth Simmons and Allison
Danner's analysis yields a similar finding.'0 7 These studies do not prove that the
ICC caused the associations they document,0 8 but they show such causation is
possible-while correlation does not show causation, causation requires
correlation.
These studies support the inference that the ICC may reduce atrocities even
when it is not actively prosecuting or even seriously considering doing so. All
find statistically significant effects across samples mostly composed of countries
in which the ICC was not conducting a preliminary examination or investigation
during the periods studied. Jo and Simmons's finding that greater ICC activity
correlated with decreased civilian killing covered many countries in which the
Court was not active during the period studied, as well as a few in which it was:
killings in all countries, total, decreased. 109 If the ICC did contribute to these
reductions in atrocities and civil war terminations, there could be many causal
paths. Potential perpetrators may have felt a vague apprehension when the ICC
stepped up its activities worldwide (Jo and Simmons) or when their own country
became a member (Appel). They therefore may have refrained from atrocities
even if the Court was not investigating their situation and thus they had no reason
to fear imminent indictment. The effects could be even less direct: Appel finds
that countries in which the ICC was involved in a particular year, at any stage
from preliminary examination to trial, were more likely to suffer a political crisis
and/or international economic sanctions, even if their level of human rights
violations was the same.' 10 Although Appel does not show the ICC caused crises
104 Jo & Simmons, supra note 56, at 460.
l0S Benjamin J. Appel, In the Shadow of the International Criminal Court: Does the ICC Deter Human
Rights Violations?, 62 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 12 (2018) (defining dependent variable); id. at 18
(reporting statistical results). Appel examined the effect on "human rights violations," which he defined
similarly to our "mass atrocities." Id. at 8.
106 Prorok, supra note 91, at 229.
107 Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court,
64 INT'L ORG. 225, 247-48 (2010) (associating joining the ICC with much improved chances of
peacefully and quickly ending a civil war, in States with less democratic regimes, less constrained
executives, or weak rule of law).
"I Alternative explanations for the fimdings may include omitted variable bias (for example, in the Jo
and Simmons study, a third factor could cause both ICC ratification and lower killing) and reverse
causation (for example, governments that expected to kill fewer civilians might be more likely to join
the ICC than others that were similar on the characteristics for which the authors controlled).
109 See supra text accompanying note 85.
0 Appel, supra note 105, at 22.
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or sanctions, that is possible, and those developments could in turn affect
potential perpetrators' behavior.
There is also evidence that our two goals may be linked: the ICC could help
prevent atrocities by increasing domestic prosecutions. Hunjoon Kim and
Kathryn Sikkink find torture, summary execution, disappearances, and political
imprisonment less common in transitional countries that prosecute more
government agents for human rights violations. 1 ' The Jo and Simmons study
also finds that the governments of countries that have called human rights
violators to account through trials and truth commissions kill fewer civilians." 2
Can the ICC stimulate prosecutions in national courts? This question has
provoked much discussion among scholars and the Court's own staff,113 but little
empirical scholarship. What scholarship there is suggests that the Court could
significantly, although not vastly, increase national-level prosecutions, but has
not yet realized that potential. Both the vague possibility of Court intervention
and specific Court actions (known as "positive complementarity' 114) may
influence national politicians, commanders, judges, or others. Their effects may
be particularly strong during preliminary examinations. Marieke Wierda notes
that ICC prosecutors have shared evidence on specific atrocity cases with
Colombian prosecutors even during the preliminary examination stage. She
concludes that ICC pressure has contributed to national authorities' decisions to
investigate and prosecute government forces' killings of civilians: in Colombia
the "'shadow effect' [of the preliminary examination] achieved more than active
investigations probably would have." 15 Sarah Nouwen's in-depth case study of
Uganda finds that the ICC's presence in Uganda and engagement with local
actors (rather than the specific cases it was pursuing) indirectly contributed to
those actors' success in creating a War Crimes Chamber in the national courts. 
16
The Court could have achieved even more there: Nouwen criticizes the ICC
Prosecutor for failing to indict government officials, "instruct[ing] ICC-
protected witnesses not to cooperate with other courts," and other decisions that
limited the Court's effect on accountability in the Ugandan courts."t 7 The ICC's
record in numerous countries leads Wierda to conclude that the Court could "act
as an incubator of domestic proceedings," but has devoted insufficient resources
... Kim & Sikkink, supra note 87, at 952-54.
112 Jo & Simmons, supra note 56, at 465. Jo and Simmons do not separate the effects of trials and truth
commissions, nor estimate the number of lives saved.
"3 See, e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO
PRACTICE (Carsten Stahn & Mohamed M. El Zeidy eds., 2011); Luis Moreno-Ocampo, A Positive
Approach to Complementarity: The Impact of the Office of the Prosecutor, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 21-32 (Carsten Stahn &
Mohamed M. El Zeidy eds., 2011).
.14 See Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 38, at 23.
115 Wierda, supra note 7, at 143.
116 NOUWEN, supra note 95, at 234-38, 240.
7 ld at 228-43. Some countries may have undertaken sham investigations after ICC intervention; we
do not consider these examples of accountability. For example, the Government of Sudan created
specialized courts and investigation authorities after major steps in the ICC's Darfur investigation, but
these have not led to significant prosecutions and appear to be "smokescreens" intended to pre-empt
ICC prosecutions without actually holding perpetrators accountable. See id. at 320-28; WEGNER, supra
note 94, at 81-93.
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to doing so and has chosen to compete rather than cooperate with national
prosecutors. 118 Remedying those errors would increase its catalytic effect. An in-
depth Human Rights Watch study finds that ICC prosecutors have contributed
somewhat to national-level accountability in Colombia and Guinea, although not
in Georgia or the United Kingdom. 19 It recommends a number of shifts that
could enhance that impact, including devoting more resources and collaborating
more with local advocates and international donors.1 20 Dancy and Montal's
fimding that the number of ICC preliminary examinations was not associated with
more domestic prosecutions in Africa, discussed above, is consistent both with
the possibility that the Court has little capacity to stimulate national-level
accountability and with our contrary conclusion, informed by other research and
the success of regional mechanisms described in Part IV, that it has unrealized
potential.12 '
The Pinochet case illustrates how national courts can be spurred to act by
the threat that other courts will prosecute. After Spanish courts sought the
extradition of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet for torture and
extrajudicial killing during the 1970s and 1980s, Chilean judges ended nearly a
decade of passivity and began prosecuting him and his subordinates. Many
scholars believe the Spanish case altered the causal ecosystem that shaped
Chilean courts' actions. For example, Pion-Berlin argues that Spanish courts'
influence flowed through the Chilean executive branch, which preferred to deal
with Pinochet at home and pressured domestic courts to act. 122 The ICC
Prosecutor might stimulate similar executive branch action in other countries by
signaling concern with national courts' inaction, such as through public or
private statements or launching a preliminary examination. The response could
depend on complex aspects of political and legal context, so the Prosecutor
would need to assess those before acting.
2. The Court's Underinvestment
Surprisingly, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and the ICC's judges have
devoted few resources to stimulating and supporting national prosecutions or to
trying to reduce atrocities. Following a narrow conception ofjudicial work, they
have focused almost entirely on investigating, indicting, and-for the few they
have apprehended-trying individual perpetrators of mass atrocities. The
Prosecutor is not wholly to blame: the ICC's Assembly of States Parties,
representing its Member States and functioning as the Court's board of directors,
takes a very narrow view of the Court's role and has denied or sharply limited
118 Wierda, supra note 7, at 111-12.
119 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRESSURE POINT: THE ICC'S IMPACT ON NATIONAL JUSTICE 6-8 (2018)
[hereinafter PRESSURE POINT]. Although written by an advocacy group, the study is balanced and relies
on scholarship as well as original interviews with government officials, activists, journalists, and judges.
Id. at 22.
120 Id. at 16-19; but see id. at 21 (noting significant limitations on the Court's potential influence).
121 Dancy & Montal, Unintended Positive Complementarity, supra note 97, at 709.
122 See David Pion-Berlin, The Pinochet Case and Human Rights Progress in Chile: Was Europe a
Catalyst, Cause or Inconsequential?, 36 J. LAT. AM. STUD. 479, 503-04 (2004).
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funding for activities other than case investigations and prosecutions. 123 The
OTP Situation Analysis Section, which conducts preliminary examinations, had
just five to six staff members until 2011 -and devoted half its time to work on
investigation-stage situations.124 Bensouda has improved matters: by 2018 the
unit had thirteen staff who appeared to be focused almost entirely on preliminary
examinations. 25 However, Human Rights Watch's analysis of their workload
concluded that this was too few even for the research and analysis tasks
necessary in that stage-such as deterining whether crimes within the Court's
jurisdiction had been committed-"let alone the steps that may be necessary to
engage national authorities in a way that can catalyze national prosecutions."'
26
For 2019, the OTP requested approximately one-fifteenth as much funding for
preliminary examinations as for investigations and prosecutions. 127
The Court also fails to make optimum use of these relatively modest
resources, as Wierda, Nouwen, and Human Rights Watch note. 28 Moreno
Ocampo's OTP occasionally shared information with national courts and
participated in seminars with local lawyers and judges, but made little attempt to
pressure national authorities to act or build the capacity of local judges and
prosecutors. 29 Preliminary examinations, except in Colombia, have involved
few of the country visits necessary to build relationships, understand complex
political conditions, and deliver many kinds of support and pressure. 30 The OTP
resists hiring political analysts who could provide the strategic, context-aware
advice on what statements or actions could refract through local politics to
increase prosecutions or reduce atrocities.13' There are some signs of greater
creativity and assertiveness: Bensouda reported that in 2018 OTP staff working
on the Nigeria preliminary examination conferred with government officials,
diplomats, and local activists; trained Nigerian prosecutors to handle mass
atrocity cases; and threatened the government that the ICC would open an
investigation and begin indicting if the government did not prosecute crimes by
its own army.132
123 Wierda, supra note 7, at 100.
124 PRESSURE POINT, supra note 119, at 162.
123 Proposed Program Budget for 2019 of the International Criminal Court 61-62, Assembly of States
Parties, 17th Sess., Dec. 5-12, 2018, ICC-ASP/17/10 (Dec. 12, 2018), https://asp.icc-
cpi.intliccdocs/asp docs/ASP 17/ICC-ASP- 17- 1 0-ENG.pdf [hereinafter ICC 2019 Proposed Budget].
126 PRESSURE POINT, supra note 119, at 162-63.
127 Compare ICC 2019 Proposed Budget, supra note 125, at 60-64 (requesting E4,332,400 for
Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and Cooperation Division, and stating that Situation Analysis Section
staff comprise less than half of the Division total) with id at 66 (requesting E19,918,700 for
Investigation Division) and id at 74 (requesting El 1,731,500 for Prosecution Division).
128 See supra text accompanying notes 116-120.
129 See WEGNER, supra note 94, at 199-200; William Burke-White, Reframing Positive
Complementarity, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY, supra note
113, at 346-47.
131 Wierda, supra note 7, at 286.
131 id.
132 Report on Preliminary Examination Activities: 2018, supra note 102, at 61-62.
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3. Colombia: A Promising Experiment
The ICC's role in Colombia's peace negotiations with right-wing
paramilitaries and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejdrcito
del Pueblo (FARC) illustrates how ICC activities other than building and
prosecuting individual cases can contribute to reducing atrocities and achieving
criminal accountability. The ICC Prosecutor has kept the Court's examination of
Colombia in the preliminary examination stage for fifteen years, since 2004,
rather than upgrading it to an investigation and issuing indictments.133 Moreno
Ocampo, then Bensouda, and their staff have engaged regularly in public and
private with the Colombian government, judiciary, and civil society, and
modulated their positions as the peace talks have progressed.134 This flexible,
strategic approach has allowed the ICC some influence in a complex, high-stakes
peace process. The Court has supported the conclusion of a landmark agreement
that could end a four-decade civil war characterized by rampant atrocities, while
preserving the possibility of criminal accountability in Colombian courts. As
Courtney Hillebrecht and Alexandra Huneeus conclude in their exceptionally
subtle study, the ICC's and Inter-American Court's effect on the Colombian
peace process suggests that "'shadow effects' [may be] the most important way
courts exert influence," rather than through indicting and prosecuting individual
cases.
1 35
Colombian combatants-including the army, FARC, and paramilitaries-
feared prosecution for the mass atrocities that all sides committed throughout the
civil war, including massacres of civilians and torture. FARC and another rebel
group compiled analyses of the chances that their personnel would be prosecuted
by the ICC as well as by Colombian courts. 136 During the peace talks, FARC
negotiators pushed hard for a full amnesty that would shield commanders and
combatants from criminal penalties.1 37 Paramilitary leader Vicente Castafto's
fear of ICC prosecution reportedly contributed to his decision to lay down
arms.
1 38
The OTP tried to affect peace talks from their inception in 2005, to promote
two goals that were somewhat in tension: ending the conflict, and thus preventing
further mass atrocities, and achieving criminal accountability for atrocities
already committed. The Prosecutor and OTP staff issued reports and statements
on the peace process. They visited Colombia to engage government officials,
judges, civil society, and media in private and public, trying to elevate concern
for criminal accountability among these actors and, through them, the public.'
39
The Inter-American Commission and domestic and international human rights
133 Wharton & Grey, supra note 49.
"' See infra text accompanying notes 139, 146-149.
... Hillebrecht & Hunecus, supra note 103, at 287; cf Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
136 Jo & Simmons, supra note 56, at 449.
137 GiSSEL, supra note 95, at 179.
13' Jo & Simmons, supra note 56, at 449.
"9 See Hillebrecht & Huneeus, supra note 103, at 295-99, 314; Rend Uruefla, Prosecutorial Politics: the
ICC's Influence in Colombian Peace Processes, 2003-2017, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 104 (2017).
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organizations made similar efforts. The Inter-American Court issued judgments
on accountability for mass atrocities in Colombia and other countries.)40
This pro-accountability coalition significantly influenced the peace
process. 14 1 For example, the government reportedly abandoned a plan to give
amnesty to several paramilitaries due to media coverage of the preliminary
examination. 142 The OTP's impact was complex, indirect, and far from
determinative, however. Whether the peace talks succeeded (thus ending
atrocities) and what forms of criminal accountability the eventual agreement
permitted were determined by a causal ecosystem shaped by the balance of
power between government and opposition parties, media discourse about the
FARC's culpability, military developments on the ground, local activists'
perceived legitimacy, and many other factors. 143 The OTP engaged this
ecosystem in myriad ways. For example, its interactions with the media and
activists likely increased their knowledge of international criminal law, helping
them critique particular semi-amnesty proposals as violations of Colombia's
international legal obligations. 144 Because many Colombian officials and
citizens took those obligations very seriously,14 5 grounding the critiques in
international law likely made them more persuasive.
The OTP monitored these complex dynamics and adapted its position
strategically. While many of its effects on the talks were convoluted, one
example reflects a more straightforward channel of influence. In a sense, the
OTP participated in the negotiations indirectly, by signaling that it would not
prosecute after a peace agreement if that agreement permitted some degree of
criminal prosecution and punishment. 146 The OTP modulated its demands as the
peace talks evolved. It framed them not as political positions aimed at achieving
the best outcome possible within many constraints, but as objective, legal
interpretations of the Rome Statute. 147 Specifically, it periodically evaluated
whether the semi-amnesties that the negotiators were considering would permit
enough national-level accountability for atrocities to satisfy the Rome Statute's
complementarity provisions and thus preclude ICC prosecutions. Early in the
talks with the FARC, Bensouda took a hard line, but she recognized the limits of
her power. Eventually, she accepted that the FARC would insist on some
protection from prosecution and that the government would acquiesce rather than
scuttle the talks. With the Colombian Constitutional Court, influential
Colombian and international NGOs, and academics also showing openness to
compromising criminal accountability to end the war,148 Bensouda softened the
140 Hillebrecht & Huneeus, supra note 103, at 299-302.
141 Id.; Uruefla, supra note 139, at 107-21.
142 Appel, supra note 105, at 9.
143 Hillebrecht & Huneeus, supra note 103, at 302-16; Reilly, supra note 96, at 162-86.
'44 Hillebrecht & Huneeus, supra note 103, at 302-07.
1
45 id.
"4 One illustration of the complexity of the ICC's channels of influence is that other actors, such as
Human Rights Watch, sometimes threatened that the ICC would intervene-attempting to exploit
perceptions that they knew the Court's intentions. Id. at 310.
147 See Uruefla, supra note 139, at 117.
148 Id. at 119.
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OTP's position. At a public event in Bogotd, her deputy signaled that the OTP
might deem the Rome Statute satisfied by criminal accountability short of full-
scale prosecution and punishment. 49 In doing so, the OTP aimed to maintain
some influence over the negotiations: maintaining a firm line could have risked
the FARC deciding that the ICC would not accept any peace terms it could
stomach, accepting the risk of eventual ICC indictments (knowing that the Court
had limited prosecutorial capacity), and insisting on a peace agreement that
completely shielded its fighters from prosecution in the Colombian courts.
In late 2016, the government and FARC reached a final peace accord,
promising an end to 40 years of fighting. The agreement sharply restricted
national prosecutions: if perpetrators confessed, then even crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC would be punishable by "a maximum of eight years of
'effective restriction of freedom,' which under 'no circumstances [was to] be
understood as jail or prison. ' 150 Opposition politicians and Human Rights
Watch denounced this provision as violating the principle of accountability for
international crimes. 15' Bensouda, by contrast, opted for silence, tacitly
endorsing an agreement that could end one of the longest-running wars in the
world, and the atrocities it had spawned.'52
The OTP's strategy for reducing atrocity and promoting accountability in
Colombia differed fundamentally from its approach to most of its situation
countries. "[T]he ICC works in Colombia not in its capacity as a court, but rather
through the OTP as an international body monitoring domestic prosecutorial
policy."'153 The fact that the Court had maintained the preliminary examination
for over a decade, rather than moving to prosecute individual cases, gave
Bensouda critical room for maneuver. As Line Engbo Gissel explains, because
the ICC had not accused specific individuals-from the government or rebel
side--of atrocities,
the Court was at liberty to be supportive [of the peace process].
It did not have to vilify alleged perpetrators or mobilize
domestic or international opinion in favour of marginalisation
or arrest. Had the OTP indicted the FARC leadership, it would
have been difficult for the Prosecutor to maintain support for
the peace process, unless it committed the conflict parties to
their surrender or arrest.
154
149 Id. at 120.
"
0 Id. at 121 (quoting the peace accord).
151 GISSEL, supra note 95, at 177.
152 See id.
... Hillebrecht & Huneeus, supra note 103, at 314.
154 GISSEL, supra note 95, at 176-77.
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The ICC's different approaches in Colombia and Uganda, where it quickly
indicted LRA commanders, thus explain why its involvement helped efforts to
end conflict in Colombia but hurt them in Uganda.
155
Whether the peace accord will hold and how many perpetrators the
Colombian courts will punish remains uncertain, 5 6 but the OTP deserves credit
for contributing to Colombians' efforts to end atrocities and secure legal
accountability for perpetrators. In the Colombia case, Bensouda and her staff
seem to have recognized the potential of tools beyond investigating and
prosecuting individual cases. Their patient, strategic efforts to contribute
positively to the complex dynamics that shaped the peace negotiations exemplify
an approach that is more promising than the ICC's conventional judicial work.
Four key conclusions emerge from the analysis in this Part. First, the ICC's
effects on mass atrocity and judicial accountability merit much more study, for
they are only partially understood. The pace of scholarship has accelerated, with
significant publications in the last five years, but most of the important findings
are supported by just one study. A number of works examine the ICC's effects
on phenomena, such as peace processes, that may in turn affect atrocity levels.
The few that clearly document ICC influence on atrocities or prosecution levels
are unable to specify the channel of influence-that is, what aspect of the ICC's
existence, status, or activities causes the effect, and through what intermediate
steps, if any. Second, there is only thin evidence that the Court's investigations,
indictments, and prosecutions of individual perpetrators reduce atrocity or
advance accountability-and some evidence that those cases exacerbate conflict
and thus potentially atrocity. Third, the Court's unimpressive record of indicting
defendants it then fails to capture, maintain a case against (such as the Kenyan
defendants), or convict may have profoundly undermined its ability to deter
potential perpetrators. Fourth and finally, ICC activities beyond the investigation
and prosecution of individual cases-including during preliminary
examinations-provide potentially powerful opportunities to prevent atrocities
and promote judicial accountability, if conducted strategically. The success of
regional human rights institutions in advancing those goals through similar
indirect means, described in the next Part, reinforces our conclusion that the ICC
has allocated its resources ineffectively. The Court should reallocate resources
away from investigating and prosecuting cases, and toward other activities that
155 See supra text accompanying note 95. Reilly's in-depth analysis of the two cases concludes, "If the
ICC plays an oversight role in conflict situations,... it acts as a guarantor for peace negotiations.
However, if the ICC plays a prosecutorial role, and therefore represents an active threat of prosecution
for leaders, it acts as a spoiler ... " Reilly, supra note 96, at 18. The contrast between Colombia and
Uganda thus adds nuance to the theory that prosecuting atrocities exacerbates conflict by giving
combatants an incentive to keep fighting to avoid prosecution.
156 See Hillebrecht & Huneeus, supra note 103, at 325-29; Nicholas Casey, Colombia's Peace Deal
Promised a New Era. So Why Are These Rebels Rearming?, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace-deal.html.
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can contribute to dynamics that increase domestic prosecutions and decrease
atrocities, including through ending conflicts.
IV. THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTITUTIONS
This Part evaluates the record of regional human rights institutions in
promoting accountability and preventing mass atrocity. We find that the success
of the European and Inter-American institutions reflects their integration with
and influence on national legal and political systems. Those derive from the
institutions' creative and strategic engagement, over time, with national-level
actors, political dynamics, and legal doctrines. Section A examines the European
Court of Human Rights. Section B covers the Inter-American Human Rights
System, consisting of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Section C examines the African
Regional Human Rights System, including the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, which
have not yet achieved comparable impact.
A. European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights ("European Court" or, in this Section,
"Court") has been widely considered one of the most influential and effective
international human rights institutions in the world. Since 1959, the Court has
overseen compliance with the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention" or in this Section
"Convention"). A leading scholar of international courts calls it "the crownjewel
of the world's most advanced international system for protecting civil and
political liberties."'157 That system is credited with raising the level of protection
of human rights throughout Europe, through States' compliance with its remedial
orders in individual cases; their reform of statutes, regulations, and
administrative and judicial procedures pursuant to the Court's interpretations of
the Convention; and their incorporation of human rights considerations into
policymaking. 158 Like other regional institutions and the ICC, the European
Court has found mass atrocities more vexing than other human rights violations,
but it appears to have contributed to preventing them and securing criminal
157 Laurence R. Heifer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep
Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 125, 125 (2008);
accord Robert Harmsen & Karen McAuliffe, The European Courts, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
EUROPEAN POLITICS 263, 269 (Josd M. Magnone ed., 2015); Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving
International Human Rights System, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 792 (2006).
' To be sure, the Court's impact has varied somewhat from country to country. See generally A
EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS (Helen Keller & Alec
Stone Sweet eds., 2008). Italy, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Greece, Romania, Poland, Hungary, and
Bulgaria have failed to implement Court judgments in many cases. See Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, Implementation of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Doe. 13864,
Sept. 9, 2015, at 9.
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accountability for them. Ordering more specific steps to prevent recurrence, as
the Court has started to do, is likely to enhance its effectiveness in pursuing both
goals.
The European Court has wider jurisdiction than the Inter-American and
African Courts, covering all forty-seven Member States of the Council of
Europe, with 820 million inhabitants, 159 any of whom may file a petition with
the Court. Its annual budget, $89 million, vastly exceeds those of its Inter-
American and African judicial counterparts, $5 million and $12 million,
respectively, in 2018.160 The result is dramatically more judicial activity: in 2018
the European Court's forty-seven full-time judges disposed of over 42,000 cases,
dismissing 40,023 and deciding 2,738 on the merits. 161 By comparison, the Inter-
American Court issued approximately 250 merits decisions from 1988 to mid-
2019, and the African Court approximately 30 from 2013 to mid-2019. 162 (The
Inter-American and African Commissions handle thousands of additional
individual petitions each year.)
This Section analyzes how the European Court shapes States' human rights
behavior (in Subsection 1), then evaluates its record in preventing and securing
criminal accountability for mass atrocities specifically (in Subsection 2).
1. Impact on Human Rights in General
The European Court significantly influences the behavior of European
States. Up to 1995, States fully implemented all but one of the judgments issued
by the Court and its now-defunct sibling, the European Commission on Human
Rights. The end of the Cold War increased demands on the European human
rights system, in quantitative and qualitative terms. The Court's jurisdiction
expanded between 1990 and 2008 from 21 states, nearly all west European
democracies, to 47, nearly half recently emerged from authoritarian communism.
The new States had worse human rights records, confronting the Court with
intractable, systemic failures and atrocities. 63 Nonetheless, the Court's impact
on State behavior remained remarkable: between 1998 and 2018, States fully
12 See The Court: General Presentation, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS.
https://www.ecbr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court&c= (last visited Nov. 17, 2019). All of those
countries have ratified the European Convention and accepted the European Court's compulsory
jurisdiction over complaints by individuals against them. The Court has no formal connection to the
European Union (EU), but all twenty-eight EU members (including the United Kingdom) are also
members of the Council of Europe.
'6 See infra, Table 1.
161 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 2018 THE ECHR IN FACTS AND FIGURES 8 (2019). States, too,
can lodge complaints against other States, but have done so only 31 times since 1959. See Inter-State
Applications, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS. (last updated Sept. 11, 2019),
https://echr.coe.int/Documents/InterState_applicationsENG.pdf.
112 See Decisions and Judgments, INTER-AM. CT. HUM. RTs.
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/cf/Jurisprudencia2/busqueda-casos-contenciosos.cfin?lang-en (last visited
Nov. 17, 2019); Contentious Matters: Finalized Cases, AFR. CT. OF HUM. & PEOPLES' RTS.
http://en.african-court.org/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-18-21#finalised-cases (last visited Nov. 17,
2019).
163 See infra text accompanying notes 181-182.
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implemented the Court's judgments in 18,437 cases, leaving 6,151 still under the
supervision of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers-a full
compliance rate of approximately 75%. 164
The Court secures a remedy for a vast number of individual victims whom
national systems have failed. 165 Every year, each of its 2,000-plus merits
decisions is processed by the respondent State, which generally pays the ordered
damages and considers other "individual measures" to make the petitioner whole
and "general measures" to prevent repetition of the violation in other cases.
Collectively, the decisions expand the Court's already extensive jurisprudence
on States' human rights obligations, a web of requirements that European States
take seriously.
The Court's systemic impact has also been impressive, inducing States to
change numerous practices to address the causes of violations.
[D]espite the fact that general measures are undoubtedly the
most difficult to implement and monitor, hundreds of such
measures have successfully resulted in the creation of new, or
significantly modified, laws and public institutions designed to
prevent the recurrence of future convention violations.'
66
Examples include building new detention centers, training child welfare
workers, creating and overseeing ethics commissions, and expanding courts'
staffs. 
16 7
In many States, the Court's influence has been more profound: it has altered
governance practices in ways that enhance human rights. Executive officials,
legislators, and judges regularly take affirmative measures to ensure that
administrative and judicial practice, legislation, executive policy, and case
164 After the Court issues a judgment finding a violation of the Convention, it passes the case to the
Committee of Ministers, which monitors the respondent State's compliance. See Committee of
Ministers, Council of Europe, 12'h Annual Report 2018, 51 (Apr. 2019) (unimplemented judgments
pending before Committee as of end of 2018); id. at 52 (number of cases closed by year, 1998-2018).
The compliance figure may be approximate because the numerator does not include cases closed before
1998, while the denominator may include some cases that date from before then. However, the number
of cases closed per year has risen rapidly since the late 1990s (the Committee closed 116 cases in 1998
and 171 in 1999, compared to 3,691 in 2017 and 2,705 in 2018), id. at 52, as has the number ofnew
cases the Court has decided and thus added to the Committee's docket, id. at 51. Therefore, the failure to
include pre-1998 data is unlikely to affect the compliance rate dramatically.
165 The individual remedies these victims receive often include financial compensation and sometimes
more specific reparation. For example, an applicant fired in violation of her human rights might receive
her job back. See Individual Measures, COUNCIL OF EUR., bttps://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-
convention/individual-measures (last updated Nov. 17, 2019).
166 OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, FROM JUDGMENT TO JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL
AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DECISIONS 52 (2010) [hereinafter FROM JUDGMENT TO JUSTICE].
167 Id. at 41. It is true that structural human rights problems in several States have persisted for decades
despite repeated Court rulings. Half or more the Court's docket consists of"repetitive cases" that
involve an issue-such as slow trials in Italy-that the Court has previously addressed, but that the State
has not cured. See Dinah Shelton, Significantly Disadvantaged? Shrinking Access to the European
Court of Human Rights, 16 HuM. RTS. L. REV. 303, 320 (2016) (citing the Court's conclusion in 2014
that 34,000 of 69,900 pending cases were repetitive).
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decisions comply with the Convention as interpreted by the Court in cases
against all States, not just their own.1 6 8 All State Parties have incorporated the
Convention into their national law.1 69 While national courts do not always defer
to the Court's interpretation of Convention rights and remedies, they accord it
great weight.170 Many States have institutionalized compliance with the
Convention in bureaucratic routines. 171 Based on the most extensive study of the
impact of the Court, by thirteen scholars examining eighteen countries, Helen
Keller and Alec Stone Sweet conclude:
[N]ational systems are increasingly porous to the influence of
the [Convention] and the case law of its Court.... [J]udges
once prohibited from engaging in judicial review of statute now
do so routinely, with reference to European rights. ....
Thousands of discre[te] legal and policy outcomes have been
altered [by legislators, executives, and judges] as a result of the
influence of Convention rights.172
The Court's judges deserve credit for their institution's influence. They have
carefully, strategically built its power since the 1950s. 173 Judges have shown
doctrinal creativity, sophistication about the potential and limits of judicial
power, and understanding of political context within Member States. Doctrinal
innovations-such as allowing States a "margin of appreciation" in
implementing their Convention obligations- have given the Court flexibility to
choose when to confront States and when to defer. Over decades, the Court "has
carefully constructed its reputation, gradually developing its role and expanding
the influence of the Convention over national legal orders but at the same time
considering states' reticence toward this 'menace' to their sovereignty." 174 As
States' compliance with individual judgments has increased the Court's
authority, its judges have become bolder and have employed their
"jurisprudential tools to engender a slow but constant change of the sphere of
sovereignty of the modem [European] state, ... incremental[ly] ero[ding] state
power." 175 Post-judgment enforcement has also grown more assertive. The
See generally OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, FROM RIGHTS TO REMEDIES: STRUCTURES AND
STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DECISIONS (2013) (cataloging
numerous domestic processes and structures for implementing international court decisions, in
executive, legislative, and judicial branches).
169 Heifer, supra note 157, at 137.
171 Id.; see also Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet, Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National Legal
Orders, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 677, 705
(Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008).
17 See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175 (1993)
(describing the impact of bureaucratic processes and management practices on States' human rights
performance).
172 Keller & Stone Sweet, supra note 170, at 677.
173 See, e.g., Heifer, supra note 157; Mikael Rask Madsen, From Cold War Instrument to Supreme
European Court: The European Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and National
Law and Politics, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 137 (2007).
174 Raduletu, supra note 30, at 465; see also Hefer, supra note 157, at 138; Robert Harmsen & Karen
McAuliffe, The European Courts, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN POLITICS 263, 270-71
(Josd M. Magone ed., 2014).
17' Hefer, supra note 157, at 138 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Committee of Ministers' supervision was once "timorous," in the view of the
Open Society Justice Initiative, but by 2010 had become "quite rigorous."
1 76
The Court's impact on human rights has been indirect, through its effect on
State officials' actions. That effect, in turn, has depended on other actors,
including human rights activists, legislators, and the media, who have used the
Court's decisions to shape others' perceptions, interests, and actions. 177 In short,
the Court has affected the "causal ecosystem" that determines whether human
rights violations occur-including mass atrocity-as well as the one that
determines whether those responsible are prosecuted.
The Court recently has shifted its approach to remedies, demanding more
specific reforms. Historically, upon finding a violation of the Convention, the
Court has ordered the offending State to pay specific financial compensation for
the victim, but left the State broad latitude to determine what other individual
measures may be necessary to fully repair the harm to the victim and what
general measures will ensure the violation is not repeated. The Court has left it
to the Committee of Ministers to assess the adequacy of the steps taken. By
contrast, the Inter-American Court has long ordered highly specific individual
and general measures, along with compensation, including judicial investigation
and prosecution of those responsible for human rights violations, reforms to law
and administrative practice, and even symbolic reparations, such as formal
apologies by the State.' 78 Since the early 2000s, the European Court has shifted
toward the Inter-American Court, ordering specific individual and general
measures in some cases.17 9 This innovation, if strategically employed and
coupled with assertive follow-up by the Committee of Ministers, could enhance
the Court's impact. In particular, regularly ordering States to investigate,
prosecute, and punish those responsible could help expand criminal
accountability for mass atrocity.
2. Impact on Mass Atrocity
During its first decades, the European Court seldom addressed grave
violations of human rights such as torture and extrajudicial killing, and never on
a mass scale. 180 Since the turn of the millennium, though, the Court's docket has
176 FROM JUDGMENT TO JUSTICE, supra note 166, at 52.
77See Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 312 (1997); James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer,
Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-
American Court, 102 AM. J. INT'L. L 768, 775 (2008).
178 Darren Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European and Inter-
American Courts of Human Rights, 6 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 35, 44 (2010).
"I Heifer, supra note 157, at 147.
180 Until the 1990s, the Court was called upon mainly to "protect[] individuals and groups from the
excesses of majoritarianism in healthy democracies and resolv[e] the relatively minor and discrete
conflicts of interests prevalent in any complex society." Heifer, supra note 157, at 129 (internal
quotation marks omitted); accordFROM JUDGMENT TO JUSTICE, supra note 166, at 37-38. One of the
few exceptions involved allegations that interrogation methods used by the United Kingdom with
terrorist suspects in Northern Ireland constituted torture. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1978). The largest-scale mass atrocities in Europe during this period, crimes against
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"changed dramatically, involving more frequent allegations of systematic human
rights abuses" 181 and regular claims of "serious and pervasive human rights
abuses such as extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and prolonged
arbitrary detention."'1 82 In 2016, twenty-five percent of the Court's judgments
finding a violation of the Convention (representing twenty-two percent of all
judgments on the merits) included a violation of the right to life or of the
prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.' 83 The shift in subject
matter was caused by a shift in geography: seventy percent of the judgments in
2016 were against East European States that ratified the Convention after
1991.184
Like other international institutions, the Court has struggled to affect the
behavior of perpetrators in the high-stakes contexts in which mass atrocities can
arise: Turkey and Russia have perpetrated those crimes while subject to the
Court's jurisdiction. However, the best interpretation of historical evidence
suggests that the Court's elaboration of detailed rules, along with the integration
of both those rules and more general human rights norms into public discourse
and State practice, have reduced the incidence of mass atrocities in Convention
Member States increased the likelihood that those who commit them will be
prosecuted. Subsection (a) examines the Court's impact on mass atrocities in
Turkey and Russia, which have perpetrated mass atrocities under the Court's
jurisdiction. Subsection (b) describes the Court's influence on Member States'
counterterrorism policies since the 9/11 attacks, illustrating its preventative
effect.
a. Promoting Accountability and Institutional Reform in
Russia and Turkey
The largest-scale mass atrocities committed under European Court
jurisdiction occurred in Turkey and Russia during counterinsurgency campaigns
against, respectively, the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the 1980s
and 1990s and militants in Chechnya from 1999 to 2009.185 We analyze the
humanity committed by Communist bloc States against their own populations, fell outside the Court's
jurisdiction because those States did not ratify the Convention until after 1989.
' FROM JUDGMENT TO JUSTICE, supra note 166, at 38.
..2 Heifer, supra note 157, at 129.
183 Violations by Article and by State 2016, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS.,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats-violation_2016 ENG.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2019) (stating
that the Court issued 829 judgments finding at least one violation and 134 judgments finding no
violations); HUDOC database of European Court of Human Rights judgments (retrieving 208 Grand
Chamber and Chamber judgments from January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016, in English,
finding a violation of Article 2 and/or Article 3); see European Convention, supra note 29, arts. 2 (right
to life) & 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment).
184 See Violations by Article and by State 2016, supra note 183 (showing 692 judgments involving
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia,
Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and/or Ukraine, out of 993 total judgments); Chart of Signatures and
Ratifications of Treaty 005: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/wcb/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/005/signatures (last visited November 14, 2019).
85 Mass atrocities in Chechnya between 1994 and 1996, as well as those in the former Yugoslavia
between 1991 and 1999, fell outside European Court jurisdiction because the Convention had not yet
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European Court's impact on these cases to illuminate the potential of regional
systems to address mass atrocity. Since deciding its first case on southeast
Turkey in 1996,186 the Court has found the Turkish State responsible for killings,
torture, and disappearances, ,and/or failing to investigate adequately and
prosecute those responsible in over 100 cases so far.187 Since 2005, the Court has
issued over 170 judgments against Russia for human rights violations by its
security forces in Chechnya for the same kinds of atrocities.188 The two
governments have paid damages to the victims, but have undertaken few serious
investigations, even fewer prosecutions, and almost no other measures to redress
the harms to individual victims. Reforms to prevent future atrocities ("general
measures") have also been rare. Still, close analysis reveals effects of the Court's
actions that have contributed to accountability and prevention, and could support
future positive developments.
Turkey and Russia vigorously resisted the Court's scrutiny in many cases,
and the Court's determined response earned praise from many human rights
activists and scholars. In the first southeastern Turkey case, the Court waived the
Convention's requirement that applicants exhaust domestic remedies before
seeking relief from the Court, due to the applicants' vulnerability to retaliation
from the Turkish military were they to apply to the Turkish courts and the
authorities' unwillingness to investigate violations by the security forces.189 The
Court waived exhaustion in other cases from southeastern Turkey and Chechnya,
as well.19° When the respondent government withheld key evidence, the Court
.sent staff to southeastern Turkey to interview witnesses and examine documents,
and convened fact-finding hearings, acting as "a de facto court of first
entered into force for the States in which they occurred. See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of
Treaty 005, supra note 184 (showing entry-into-force dates). On the atrocities, see HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, MAKING JUSTICE COUNT IN CHECHNYA: IMPLEMENTATION OF EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS RULINGS AGAINST RUSSIA 2 (2011),
https://admin.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related material/2011 _Russia ECtHRImplementation.pdf
[hereinafter MAKING JUSTICE COUNT]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TIME FOR JUSTICE: ENDING IMPUNITY
FOR KILLINGS AND DISAPPEARANCES IN 1990s TURKEY 1, 11 (2012),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/turkey09l2ForUpload.pdf [hereinafter TIME FOR
JUSTICE]; Dilek Kurban, Europe as an Agent of Change: The Role of the European Court of Human
Rights and the EU in Turkey's Kurdish Policies 8-9 (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper
9,2014).
186 Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 21893/93, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber); see
Kurban, supra note 185, at 15-16 n.66.
i87 See TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 10-11; Dilek Kurban, Forsaking Individual Justice: The
Implications of the European Court ofHuman Rights 'Pilot Judgment Procedure for Victims of Gross
and Systematic Violations, 16 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 731,745-49 (2016).
l88 Philip Leach, The Chechen Conflict. Analysing the Oversight of the European Court of Human
Rights, 2008 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 732, 734 (2008) (date of first judgment); MAKING JUSTICE
COUNT, supra note 185, at 5; Silvia Borelli, Domestic Investigation and Prosecution of Atrocities
Committed during Military Operations: The Impact of Judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights, 46 ISR. L. REV. 369, 377 (2013). Hillebrecht refers to "over 210" cases "regarding Chechnya,"
although she does not indicate whether all of these alleged atrocities. Courtney Hillebrecht,
Implementing International Human Rights Law at Home: Domestic Politics and the European Court of
Human Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. REV. 279,289 (2012).
's Akdivar, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 70-77.
'oSee, e.g., Leach, supra note 188, at 739; Julia Lapitskaya, ECHR, Russia, and Chechnya: Two is Not
Company and Three is Definitely a Crowd, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 479, 524-26 (2011); Kurban,
supra note 187, at 751-52.
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instance."191 This departure from regional human rights courts' normal appellate
role, complementing national legal systems, was costly and time-consuming for
the Court, and likely stretched staff and judges' capacity. In these cases,
however, it represented an effective and flexible adaptation to the specific legal
and political conditions it confronted.
In the southeastern Turkey and Chechnya cases, the Court has consistently
stressed the respondent States' duty to investigate and prosecute atrocities. 192 In
many cases in which the Court has found insufficient evidence to establish State
responsibility for a particular violation, such as disappearances, the Court has
found the State in violation of the relevant article of the Convention (e.g., Article
2 guaranteeing the right to life) based on failure to investigate and prosecute the
perpetrators. 193
The Court's impact on'accountability and the incidence of atrocities in the
Turkish and Russian situations has been mixed. Turkey and Russia have
generally paid Court-ordered compensation, 194 but have made little effort to
investigate or prosecute the atrocities for which the Court has found them
responsible. 195 Human Rights Watch found that "[u]ntil 2008, there were no
attempts in Turkey to investigate and put on trial members of the security forces
for their involvement in gross and systematic violations of human rights" during
the fight against the PKK through the 1990s,' 9 6 and "only a handful" of Soldiers
had been charged by the end of 2015.197 The result, according to the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions
and many other analysts, is a climate of "impunity" for atrocities.1 98 Impunity
reigns in Russia, too: as of 2011, according to Human Rights Watch, "[w]ith
only one exception, the Russian authorities have not brought the direct
perpetrators or any of those responsible to justice. This is true even in cases in
191 Kurban, supra note 187, at 747; see also Onder Bakircioglu & Brice Dickson, The European
Convention in Conflicted Societies: The Experience of Northern Ireland and Turkey, 66 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 263, 281-82 (2017); Ba~ak Cah, The Logics of Supranational Human Rights Litigation, Official
Acknowledgment, and Human Rights Reform: The Southeast Turkey Cases before the European Court
of Human Rights, 1996-2006, 35 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 311, 321-22 (2010); Helfer, supra note 157, at 142-
44; Sixty-six percent of all factfinding missions undertaken by the Commission or Court up to 2017
were to Turkey. Bakircioglu & Dickson, supra note 191, at 282 n.104.
192 See Borelli, supra note 188, at 373-74; see also Rdduletu, supra note 30, at 458-60.
'9 See, e.g., Kharayeva v. Russia, App. No. 2721/11, 62-67 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 27, 2014); see also
Bakircioglu & Dickson, supra note 191, at 287; Kurban, supra note 185, at 16.
194 Cah, supra note 191, at 313; MAKING JUSTICE COUNT, supra note 185, at 1.
195 See FROM JUDGMENT TO JUSTICE, supra note 166, at 53 (concluding that "[i]nvestigating and
prosecuting gross human rights violations is [an] area in which implementation [of European Court
judgments] has largely failed"). Dilek Kurban's analysis found that, as of 2015, in 69% of 253 cases of
enforced disappearance in the 1990s in the Kurdish region of Turkey (the southeast), the State had not
opened an investigation. Kurban, suprq note 187, at 766.
196 TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 8.
197 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2016 WORLD REPORT 580 (2016). Even fewer have been convicted: in 2015
there were acquittals in four cases, and no convictions. Id.; see also Christof Heyns (Special
Rapporteur), Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
Addendum: Follow-Up to Country Recommendations: Turkey, 50, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/37/Add.4
(May 6, 2015) (noting that "only a handful of trials have been conducted in relation to the thousands of
unresolved execution-type killings, deaths in custody and enforced disappearances suspected to have
been committed by State officials and members of the PKK during the 1990s").
198 Heyns, supra note 197, 54; accord Bakircioglu & Dickson, supra note 191, at 292.
2020]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
which the [European Court] has found that the perpetrators are known, and in
some instances even named in its judgments." 199 The Russian government
"pay[s] reparations to placate the victims while ignoring the larger structural
reforms mandated by the Committee of Ministers."
200
The Court has positively influenced both situations, however. It may have
stopped atrocities in at least a few cases: according to Professor Emma Gilligan,
Chechen security forces released several people they abducted-and might have
tortured or disappeared-after the European Court issued emergency orders.
20 1
There is more evidence that the Court has slightly increased after-the-fact
accountability. A recent study identified twelve trials for human rights violations
in southeastern Turkey that had begun since 2008. None had resulted in
convictions, though six were ongoing as of 2015 .202 A detailed account by
Human Rights Watch of one unsuccessful prosecution (the "Temizi5z case")
suggested that prosecutors had made a serious effort to obtain convictions.
20 3
Frustrated by the Russian authorities' recalcitrance, the Court in 2012 found that
disappearances in Chechnya "result[ed] from systemic problems at the national
level, for which there is no effective domestic remedy., 20 4 It proposed numerous
reforms, including allocating more resources to investigations and creating a
high-level body to investigate disappearances. 20 5 While the government has
continued to drag its feet despite annual questioning from the Committee of
Ministers regarding implementation of this and other Court decisions on
atrocities in Chechnya, the Committee reports that Russia has taken some steps,
such as increasing investigative resources. The Committee's reports describe
extensive engagement with Russian government representatives over the
implementation of Chechnya decisions, including detailed discussions of
procedures and progress in individual investigations.20 6 It seems likely that
pressure from Strasbourg accounts for this modest progress.
The Court may have contributed to accountability and prevention through
more indirect means as well, although the magnitude of these contributions is
199 MAKING JUSTICE COUNT, supra note 185, at 1; accord Borelli, supra note 188, at 378 n.48;
Lapitskaya, supra note 190, at 527-29; Rend Prevost, Teetering on the Edge of Legal Nihilism: Russia
and the Evolving European Human Rights Regime, 37 HuM. RTS. Q. 289, 318 (2015); Riduletu, supra
note 30, at 464; Freck van der Vet, Transitional Justice in Chechnya: NGO Political Advocacy for
Implementing Chechen Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 38 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L.
363, 365 (2013).
200 Hillebrecht, supra note 188, at 285.
20I See Emma Gilligan, The Costs of Peace in Chechnya, CURRENT HIST. 266,269 (Oct. 2015) (stating
that Court orders have "secured the release of several individuals").
202 See Jessica G. Mecellem, Human Rights Trials in an Era of Democratic Stagnation: The Case of
Turkey, 43 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 119, 126 (2018).
203 See TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 21-44; Eight Suspects Acquitted over 21 Unsolved Murders
in Turkey's Southeast, HfJRRIYET DAILY NEWS (Nov. 6, 2015),
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eight-suspects-acquitted-over-21 -unsolved-murders-in-turkeys-
southeast--90824.
204 Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia, App. No. 2944/06 217 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 18, 2012).
205 Id. 222-37.
206 See Committee of Ministers, *Council of Europe, 11h Annual Report, at 138 (Mar. 2018); Committee
of Ministers, Council of Europe, Notes on the Agenda: H46-18 Group Khashiyev and Akayeva v.
Russian Federation (Application No. 57942/00): Supervision of the execution of the European Court's
judgments, CM/Notes/1324/H46-18 (Sep. 20, 2018).
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difficult to assess. According to several analysts, its judgments on both
southeastern Turkey and Chechnya have increased international and domestic
awareness, particularly of State agents' direct role in the abuses and failed
investigations. 20 7 Similarly, the judgments have made it more difficult for the
Turkish and Russian governments to deny those facts, and thus allowed
international and domestic advocates, from the European Union to local NGOs,
to focus on pressing for specific reforms. 20 8
The European Court's influence has also flowed through the European
Union, which in the 2000s pressed Turkey to implement reforms recommended
by the European Court, as part of negotiations over Turkey's possible accession
to the EU.20 In 2002, authorities lifted the state of emergency regime that had
governed Kurdish areas since 1980210 and in 2004 they abolished militarized
State security courts and statutes of limitation for genocide and crimes against
humanity.2 11 A variety of reforms to law, police training, and operational practice
dramatically reduced torture by police.2 12 For example, Turkey eliminated the
statute of limitations for torture in 2013213 following the European Court's
criticism that it inhibited accountability.2 14 The government has rolled back
safeguards against torture since a July 2016 coup attempt, but many of the
"impressive ... legal and administrative reforms and training ... to prevent
human rights violations ' 215 of the kind that occurred in southeastern Turkey
remain in place, and testify to the Court's influence.
Turkey's counterinsurgency tactics may have shifted since the 1990s to
better respect human rights and, in particular, to avoid mass atrocity, although
the evidence is far from conclusive. Beginning in August 2015, the Turkish
military conducted its most intense military operations inside the country since
the 1990s, again targeting the PKK and aligned groups in the southeast. The army
sealed off several cities, warned civilian inhabitants to leave, and then attacked
207 See Bakircioglu & Dickson, supra note 191, at 280; Cab, supra note 191, at 325; Gilligan, supra note
201, at 269; Lapitskaya, supra note 190, at 521; Dilek Kurban, Ozan Erdzden & Haldun Gtllalp,
Supranational Rights Litigation, Implementation and the Domestic Impact of Strasbourg Court
Jurisprudence: A Case Study of Turkey 48 (2008),
http://www.kureselincelemeler.org/Turkey%20case%20study/2Oreport-final.pdf.
201 See Gilligan, supra note 201, at 269; Kurban et al., supra note 207, at 5; cf Mecellem, supra note
202, at 132; but see Call, supra note 191, at 333 (stating that the Turkish government maintains "a
dismissive and defensive discourse about the actions of its security forces in the Southeast").
" "The reforms were introduced in order to meet the so-called Copenhagen criteria [for EU
membership], but several actually derived from Court judgments issued in Strasbourg." Bakircioglu &
Dickson, supra note 191, at 290. Call's list of "major legal and administrative reforms affecting the
southeast Turkey cases" contains eighteen changes from 1999 to 2004 alone. Call, supra note 191, at
328.
2'0 Bakircioglu & Dickson, supra note 191, at 29.
21 Kurban et al., supra note 207, at 35, 47.
212 Nils Muitnieks (Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe), Report Following his
Visit to Turkey from I to 5 July 2013, In 5, 12, Council of Europe Doe. No. CommDH(2013)24 (Nov.
26, 2013).2 13 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TURKEY'S HUMAN RIGHTS ROLLBACK: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
4 (2014), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/turkey09l4_ForUpload.pdf.
214 See TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 46.
215 Call, supra note 191, at 333.
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using artillery barrages, aerial bombing, and infantry assaults. These tactics
leveled large swaths of housing and other infrastructure and led to the deaths of
approximately 1,200 local residents, some of whom may have engaged in
violence against government forces, along with nearly 800 government
personnel.216 These are very serious human rights violations-yet are less
atrocious than the army's methods in the 1980s and 1990s; for example, security
forces have not returned to their prior practice of extensive summary executions
and disappearances. The four disappearances in the eighteen months from July
2015 and December 2016 reported by the United Nations are too many, 21 7 but
far below the estimated average of approximately ninety every eighteen months
from 1980 to 2001.2l8 These violations are indefensible and cause terrible
suffering, but their significantly smaller scale represents some progress that may
have resulted, at least in part, from the European Court's condemnation of those
practices. 219 (We see little evidence that Russian military tactics have shifted to
comport better with human rights norms.220)
b. Preventing Mass Atrocity During Counterterrorism
Operations Since 9/11
The European Court's impact on Member States' counterterrorism
operations since September 11, 2001, demonstrates how regional institutions can
prevent and limit mass atrocity, as well as contribute to struggles for criminal
accountability. 22' The Court and the Convention are key parts of an extensive
web of norms and institutions that protect human rights in Europe, which also
includes other instruments, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs.
Through both specific actions and generalized, diffuse channels of influence, that
web has constrained European States' counterterrorism strategies and limited
their infringements on human rights.
Many European States might well have responded to the latest wave of
terrorism by committing mass atrocity. The fact that they largely have not
216 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in South-East Turkey: July 2015 to December 2016, 2 (Feb. 2017),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/TR/OHCHRSouth-
East TurkeyReport 10March2017.pdf.
217 Id., In 45-46.
218 See Yeliz Budak, Dealing with the Past: Transitional Justice, Ongoing Conflict and the Kurdish
Issue in Turkey, 9 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 219, 235 n.98 (2015).
219 Atrocities by the Turkish military and its allies in northern Syria in late 2019 may weigh against this
hopeful conclusion. See, e.g., Syria: Damning Evidence of War Crimes and Other Violations by Turkish
Forces and Their Allies, AMNESTY INT'L (Oct. 18, 2019),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/1 0/syria-damning-evidence-of-war-crimes-and-other-
violations-by-turkish-forces-and-their-allies/.
220 Recent campaigns have extensively violated human rights and international humanitarian law.
Russia's eight-day campaign in Georgia included indiscriminate aerial, artillery, and tank strikes that
killed and wounded many civilians. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UP IN FLAMES: HUMANITARIAN LAW
VIOLATIONS AND CIVILIAN VICTIMS IN THE CONFLICT OVER SOUTH OSSETIA 7-9 (Jan. 2009). However,
Russian tactics in Chechnya were so brutal that even moderately atrocious methods now might represent
improvement.
221 These counterterrorism operations have included independent and joint operations (with the United
States and other allies), on their own territory and abroad, against transnational networks, local groups,
and individuals.
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demonstrates the capacity of the continent's strong human rights traditions and
oversight institutions, including the European Court, to curtail abuse. State
responses to terrorist acts often entail serious human rights violations, including
mass atrocity.22 2 Indeed, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes have often tried
to justify such crimes by contending they are necessary to defeat terrorism-real
or imagined. For example, military dictatorships in Chile and Argentina in the
1970s and 1980s argued that their large-scale torture, forced disappearances,
extrajudicial killings, and arbitrary detention were necessary to combat violence
by non-state actors that those regimes labeled "terrorism., 2 23 After September
11, 2001, the United States quickly jettisoned basic human rights principles and
engaged in torture, arbitrary detention, and war crimes. European States'
counterterrorism campaigns after the September 11, 2001, attacks, which
intensified after bombings in 2004 in Madrid and 2005 in London, might have
incorporated mass atrocities, or come close.
The European Court built an important and extensive body of jurisprudence
relevant to counterterrorism operations before 9/11 and developed it further
thereafter. Since the 1970s, the Court has elaborated on permissible interrogation
techniques in counterterrorism, building on its 1978 ruling in Ireland v. United
Kingdom.224 Since then, the Court has also considered how long States may
lawfully hold terrorist suspects without charging them, 22 5 the conditions under
which they may be held,226 how they may be surveilled, 227 how much force may
be used to stop attacks,228  and other questions. The interactions of
counterterrorism with political rights and freedom of religion have yielded
additional lines of caselaw. 229 Some analysts have praised the Court's
counterterrorism jurisprudence for its "subtle ... balancing of competing
interests, 23" although many human rights activists, as well as some scholars,
have criticized the Court for countenancing government human rights violations,
while governments have criticized it for restricting them too much.23 1 In addition,
222 See WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 147-49. The current Egyptian dictatorship uses similar rhetoric to
justify human rights violations of a similar nature and possibly similar scale. See AMNESTY INT'L,
EGYPT: "OFFICIALLY, YOU DO NOT EXIST": DISAPPEARED AND TORTURED IN THE NAME OF COUNTER-
TERRORISM (July 13, 2016).
13 WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 148-49.
224 See, e.g., Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R.; see Ireland v. United
Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
225 See, e.g., Brogan & Others v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 11209/84, 11234/84,11266/84, 11386/85
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 29, 1988).
226 See, e.g., Fr&ot v. France, App. No. 70204/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 12, 2007).
227 See, e.g., Szab6 & Vissy v. Hungary, App. No. 37138/14 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 12, 2016).
228 See, e.g., McCann & Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sep. 27, 1995).
229 See, e.g., Giler & Ugur v. Turkey, App. Nos. 31706/10, 33088/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 2,2014);
United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
230 Donald W. Jackson, Detention and Treatment of Suspected Terrorists under the European
Convention of Human Rights, in COURTS AND TERRORISM: NINE NATIONS BALANCE RIGHTS AND
SECURITY 112, 128 (Mary L. Volcansek & John F. Stack, Jr., eds. 2010).
231 Compare UK: European Court Ruling Sends Mixed Message on Torture, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan.
18, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/0 1/18/uk-european-court-ruling-sends-mixed-message-
torture with Helen Fenwick, Post 9/11 UK Counter-Terrorism Cases in the European Court of Human
Rights: A "Dialogic " Approach to Rights Protection or Appeasement of National Authorities?, in
CRITICAL DEBATES ON COUNTER-TERRORISM JUDICIAL REvIEw 302 (Fergal F. Davis & Fiona de
Londras eds., 2014) with Alan Travis, Theresa May Criticizes Human Rights Convention After Abu
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cases with no terrorism connection have generated an extensive web of rules that
States must respect in designing and carrying out counterterrorism strategies. For
example, suspects must be granted access to counsel soon after detention,
dramatically reducing the likelihood of torture.
Human rights concerns, including the Convention's strictures as interpreted
by the Court, have influenced European governments' counterterrorism
strategies and practices since 2001, although the degree of that influence is the
object of dispute.23 2 As Section IV.A. 1, above, explains, the Convention and the
Court's jurisprudence shape the policies and daily practice of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of European governments. Furthermore,
counterterrorism cooperation programs of the European Union and Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as of the Council of Europe,
make extensive reference to the European Convention. In 2002, the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Guidelines on Human Rights and
the Fight Against Terrorism, recognizing the Convention and the caselaw of the
Court as "a primary source for defining guidelines for the fight against
terrorism. ' 233 In the eighteen years since 9/11, European counterterrorism
strategies and tactics have been subjected to extensive review within
governments and-in many cases-by external experts, the media, and citizens.
While much of that review has focused on their effectiveness in preventing
attacks, a good deal has focused on human rights. Offices within governments
tasked with protecting human rights, including legal advisers to ministries and
security forces, inject human rights considerations into debates over policy and
its day-to-day implementation. In part because of the European Convention and
Court, human rights have been incorporated into both the personal value systems
of influential individuals and the institutional structures and routines of European
States.
Since 9/11, no European State (except possibly Turkey and Russia) appears
to have systematically employed counterterrorism methods that fall within our
definition of mass atrocity.2 34 The numerous small-scale-and some large-
Qatada Affair, GUARDIAN (July 8, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/julO8/theresa-may-
human-rights-abu-qatada.
232 Compare, e.g., Kendall W. Stiles, The Dissemination of International Liberal Norms: The Case of
the ECHR and the UK, 39 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 135, 144 (2006) (concluding that "where questions of
terrorism are concerned, policy elites in Britain are willing to set aside Convention restrictions, both
formally and informally") with Olivier Cahn, The Fight Against Terrorism and Human Rights: The
French Perspective, in A WAR ON TERROR? THE EUROPEAN STANCE ON A NEW THREAT, CHANGING
LAWS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS 467, 484 (Marianne Wade & Almir Maljevid eds., 2010)
(concluding, before the 2015 institution of a state of emergency, that France had "provided its security
services with legal tools that certainly contribute to the French antiterrorism system now being regarded
as effective, while safeguarding its overall consistency with the provisions of the European Convention
on Human Rights").
2 3 3 COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GUIDELINES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FIGHT
AGAINST TERRORISM 16 (2002).
234 This is not to say that these States' counterterrorism practices have respected human rights. To the
contrary, some have seriously violated them. See, e.g., France: Prolonged Emergency State Threatens
Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 22, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/22/france-prolonged-
emergency-state-threatens-rights; UK: Human Rights Watch Challenges Surveillance, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Sep. 14, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/14/uk-human-rights-watch-challenges-
surveillance. The Court has condemned Italy and Macedonia for permitting the CIA to abduct suspects
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scale-terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and Germany
just since 2015 show that European States continue to struggle to prevent
terrorism. As they do so, they are likely to press the limits of human rights,
testing the European Convention and European Court. However, without the
continent's extensive system of norms and institutions protecting human rights,
with the Convention and Court at its center, European States might well have
been tempted to follow the United States and many African, Latin American, and
Asian countries in resorting to war crimes, torture, and other mass atrocities after
terrorist attacks.
B. Inter-American Human Rights System
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was created in 1959 as
a subsidiary organ of the Organization of American States (OAS) and began
work in 1960.235 The Inter-American Court came into legal existence in 1978,
and began operation in 1979.236 The Commission oversees compliance by OAS
members with the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man237 and
compliance by the parties to the American Convention on Human Rights with
that treaty.2 38 The Court hears cases alleging violations of the Convention by
parties that have recognized its jurisdiction. 239 (References in this Section to
"Commission" and "Court" refer to these Inter-American institutions.)
The Inter-American system has been a central player in the Western
Hemisphere's relatively successful transition from authoritarian to civilian rule,
with the concomitant reduction in mass atrocity and the advance of
accountability. Further, the norms established in the Americas, largely by the
Inter-American system, have served as the baseline for assessing the
responsibility of State and third-party actors for abuses, such as disappearance,
and for ensuring some degree of accountability during transitional periods and
beyond. The Inter-American system, as outlined below, has done this primarily
by stimulating domestic authorities to develop and implement plans and policies
on their territory who were later tortured, and Poland, Lithuania, and Romania for hosting secret CIA
torture centers. See Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, App. No. 46454/11 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 31, 2018); Al
Nashiri v. Romania, App. No. 33234/12 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 31, 2018); Nasr & Ghali v. Italy, App. No.
44883/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 23, 2016); El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
2012-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 361; Al Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761/11 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 24, 2014).
231 See About the IACHR, ORG. OF AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp (last
visited Nov. 14, 2019).
236 See I/A Court History, INTER-AM CT. OF HUM. RTS., http://www.corteidh.or.cr/historia-en.cfm (last
visited Nov. 14, 2019).
237 DAVID WEISSBRODT & CONNIE DE LA VEGA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 328 (2007).
238 American Convention, supra note 29, art. 44.
239 Id. art. 62(3). Both institutions may also hear cases involving violations of other human rights treaties
to the extent that those treaties permit such jurisdiction. For a thorough overview of the standards and
practice of the Inter-American Commission and Court, see JAMES L. CAVALLARO ET AL., DOCTRINE,
PRACTICE, AND ADVOCACY IN THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM (2019).
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to account for torture, forced disappearances, and summary and extrajudicial
executions.
Mass atrocity has been at the center of the work and rise to prominence of
the Inter-American system since the 1970s. In Argentina in 1976, a military junta
launched a ferocious campaign of forced disappearances and torture against
guerrillas, union organizers, liberation theologians, students, journalists, and
everyone else it perceived as a threat. The Commission soon began pressing the
regime to allow it to visit the country to investigate the human rights violations,
finally securing permission in 1979. The Commission was not deceived by the
dictatorship's elaborate efforts to conceal its atrocities. Instead, it skillfully
documented heinous abuses and issued a damning report in 1980. The
Commission's visit and report provided crucial international validation of the
scale of the atrocities and the State's responsibility for them, feeding concern in
Washington and European capitals that translated into pressure on the junta. The
government truth commission later found that forced disappearances sharply
declined during the Commission's engagement. Leading social scientists Keck
and Sikkink agree. 2
40
The Commission engaged in similar, real-time documentation and reporting
on abuses in Central and South America and in the Caribbean, issuing reports on
the human rights situations in countries throughout the Hemisphere with brutal
military regimes. Between 1977 and 1988, the Inter-American Commission
issued twenty-one reports on human rights situations in thirteen countries-all
either controlled by a military or revolutionary regime or in transition to
democracy. 241
Although created in 1979, the Inter-American Court did not hear its first
contentious cases-three matters involving forced disappearances in
Honduras-until 1986. The Court's ground-breaking decision in Veldsquez
Rodriguez v. Honduras established a standard for State responsibility that has
been adopted by national and international systems worldwide.
In the years of transition to democratic rule, mass atrocity and accountability
continued to guide the work of the Inter-American system. In the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the Inter-American Court and Commission worked in synergy with
an increasing number of sympathetic, newly democratic governments and
240 See MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 107-08 (1998)
(summarizing figures from annex to truth commission report). The regime forcibly disappeared 4,105
people in 1976, 3,098 in 1977, 969 in 1978, 181 in 1979, and 83 in 1980.
241 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/ll.40, doc.10 (1977); Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Argentina, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/IJ.49, doc.19 corr.1 (1980). In all, the Commission
issued twenty-one reports between 1977 and 1988 on the human rights situations, in general, or on
particular issues in thirteen countries under military, revolutionary, or transitional regimes: Chile (1977,
1985); Uruguay (1978); Paraguay (1978, 1987); Panama (1978); Nicaragua (1978, 1981, 1983); El
Salvador (1978); Haiti (1979, 1988); Cuba (1979, 1983); Argentina (1980); Colombia (1981);
Guatemala (1981, 1983, 1985); Suriname (193, 1985); and Bolivia (1985).
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vigorous, experienced civil society movements.242 Peace agreements ended civil
wars in Guatemala and El Salvador, reducing the motivation and opportunity for
national armies and rebel movements to victimize civilians. By the 1990s, mass
atrocities had largely abated. (The main exceptions were Peru, until the fall of
Fujimori in 2000, and Colombia). With the end of civil conflicts, the Inter-
American Commission and Court turned to promoting investigation and
punishment of mass atrocities that had already occurred and to advancing
institutional reforms to prevent them from recurring. The Inter-American
institutions received legitimacy from friendly governments and civil society
actors, and a reputation for effectiveness from national-level successes driven
mainly by the latter. Legitimacy and reputed effectiveness translated into further
influence.
The impact can be measured not only in the caselaw and standards on mass
atrocity and accountability established by the Inter-American Commission and
Court, but also in the domestic accountability processes and reforms stimulated
by the pressure of Inter-American standards and engagement. These measures
include high-profile criminal prosecutions, including in Argentina, Chile, and El
Salvador, outlined below; state-sponsored truth commissions; constitutional and
statutory reforms; and legislative initiatives including reparations to victims of
mass atrocities in numerous countries. While violence continues to plague Latin
American societies-particularly in the context of criminal law enforcement and
drug trafficking-the Inter-American system has played a central role in
transforming the causal ecosystems that determine the incidence of politically
motivated mass atrocity in many countries in the Hemisphere, dramatically
reducing it.
A second, essential measure of the impact of the work of the Inter-American
system has been criminal investigations and prosecutions of those responsible
for mass atrocity. Throughout the region, in many cases years and decades after
the abuses themselves, prosecutors have initiated prosecutions of State agents
responsible for torture, forced disappearance, and mass killings. Initially,
amnesty laws prevented these criminal processes. The work of the Inter-
American Commission and Court to delegitimize amnesty laws has been a
central, if not the central, force moving individual State judiciaries and
legislatures to overrule or repeal amnesties, thus allowing prosecutions. As we
explain below, the Commission issued historic determinations holding the
amnesty laws in Argentina and Uruguay to violate the American Convention in
1992.243 A decade later, the Court, in the Barrios Altos case against Peru, reached
the same conclusion.244 To date Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Peru and Uruguay
242 Key transitional moments included the inauguration of democratic governments in Argentina in
1983, Brazil and Uruguay in 1985, and Chile in 1990, and the end of civil wars in Guatemala in 1996
and El Salvador in 1992.
243 See Herrera et al. v. Argentina, Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309, 10.311, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 28/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14, corr.1 (1992); Mendoza et al. v.
Uruguay, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374, 10.375, Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R., Report No. 29/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14, corr.1 (1992).
244 Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, 41 (March 14, 2002)
(holding that "all amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the establishment of measures
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have removed barriers to prosecutions of those responsible for mass atrocity. In
2005, the Argentine Supreme Court ruled two decades-old amnesty laws
unconstitutional, citing the Inter-American Court's decision in Barrios Altos v.
Perti throughout its decision.245 In July 2016, the Supreme Court of El Salvador
ruled that an amnesty law passed shortly after the end of its twelve-year civil war
was unconstitutional.246 In September 2016, the Second Court of San Francisco
de Gotera reopened an investigation into the 1981 killing of hundreds of civilians
by government forces in El Mozote.24 7
The Inter-American institutions' realistic attention to political context, their
level of power, and the process of building it over time have been essential to
their success. For example, in the early 1990s the Commission found that
amnesties in Argentina and Uruguay contradicted those States' international
human rights obligations. However, it chose not to bring that question to the
Court for a legally binding determination, out of concern that the Court might
uphold the amnesties--or strike them down but have its authority weakened if
the States defied the ruling.24
8
Alexandra Huneeus has examined the effect of decisions of the Inter-
American system by analyzing the connection between sentences requiring
investigation and prosecution and subsequent investigations and prosecutions in
States in the Americas. She concludes, as we analyze in Section V, that the
impact of the sentences of the Court has been nearly as significant as that of the
ICC, ICTY and ICTR combined, despite its relatively modest budget.
As Huneeus writes:
[T]he Inter-American Court of Human Rights has made
national prosecution of gross, state-sponsored crimes a
centerpiece of its regional agenda. The Court ... regularly
orders states to investigate, try, and punish those responsible
for gross human rights violations as a form of equitable relief.
Then, through another interpretive twist, it supervises states'
implementation of its orders: it holds mandatory hearings and
issues compliance reports that aspire to hasten and guide the
progress of national criminal processes. The Court has decreed
and is actively monitoring prosecutions of international crimes
in roughly fifty-one cases across fifteen states. Pursuant to its
orders in these cases, states have launched new criminal
designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the
investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations such as torture,
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced disappearance.").
245 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 14/6/2005,
"Julio Sim6n et al. c. Poder Judicial de la Naci6n," No. 17.768, S. 1767. XXXVIII (Arg.) (ruling Laws
Nos. 23.492 (1986) and 23.521 (1987) unconstitutional).
246 Supreme Court, July 3, 2016, Judgment Regarding Law No. 486 of March 20, 1993, 44-2013/145-
2013 (El Sal.).
247 See Second Court of First Instance, San Francisco Gotera, Moraz~n, Sept. 30, 2016, El Mozote
Massacre, Penal Case 238/90 (El Sal.).
248 Cavallaro & Brewer, supra note 177, at 819.
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investigations, exhumed mass graves, moved cases from
military to civil jurisdiction, overturned amnesties, bypassed
statutes of limitations, and created new institutions and working
methods to facilitate prosecution of such crimes. Indeed, at
least thirty-nine prosecutions launched pursuant to the Court's
orders have yielded convictions.2 49
To provide greater context, we consider below the influence of the
Commission and Court in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. The three cases enable
comparative assessment of the impact of the Inter-American system on
accountability within each country, as well as the development of the regional
mechanisms themselves. All three countries experienced significant periods of
authoritarian, military rule-17 years in Chile, 7 years in Argentina and 21 years
in Brazil-based on extensive, gross violations of human rights that rose to the
level of crimes against humanity. In all three states, military authorities
summarily executed, forcibly disappeared, and/or tortured thousands of people.
In both absolute and relative terms, however, the levels of slaughter were higher
in Argentina and Chile than in Brazil. So too was the degree of engagement
between local human rights activists and the Inter-American system. These
similarities and differences facilitate analysis of the efficacy of the regional
human rights system in the short and long terms.
1. Argentina
On March 24, 1976, a military coup deposed President Isabel Per6n, second
wife of Argentine leader Juan Per6n and his successor in the presidency on his
death. The years immediately prior to 1976 had seen high levels of tension
between insurgent groups and counter-insurgency forces. 250 Still, atrocities rose
dramatically after the coup, including the widespread use of forced
disappearance to attempt to eliminate all opponents and stifle dissent. Over the
course of the next few years, security forces rounded up thousands of suspected
guerrillas, sympathizers, union organizers, student leaders, and others. After
wholesale secret detention and torture, Argentine security forces killed
thousands and eliminated their victims without a trace, in significant measure by
drugging them and forcing them off planes to their death at sea.2 51
In 1979, as noted above, the Argentine government allowed the Inter-American
Commission to visit the country. During its visit, the Commission gathered
evidence of thousands of forced disappearances. The domestic and international
249 Alexandra Huneeus, International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal Jurisdiction
of the Human Rights Bodies, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (2013).
250 As Keck and Sikkink write in their review of this period, "[e]ven before the military coup of March
1976, international human rights pressures had influenced the Argentine military's decision to cause
opponents to 'disappear,' rather than imprisoning them or executing them publicly." KECK & StKKTNK,
supra note 240, at 103-04.
251 On the Argentine practice of drugging detainees and forcing them to their deaths from planes, see
HoRAcIo VERBITSKY, THE FLIGHT: CONFESSIONS OF AN ARGENTINE DIRTY WARRIOR (1996).
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attention created by the Commission's visit is credited by many, including Keck
and Sikkink, with prompting a significant reduction in forced disappearances.
252
In 1982 and 1983, after seven years of military rule, the junta lost control of
Argentina, due to an economic downturn brought about by the Latin American
debt crisis and the humiliating defeat at the hands of the British Navy in the
Falklands/Malvinas War. In late 1983, Rafil Alfonsin was elected president on a
human rights platform.
Ernesto Sibato, a respected author, headed a truth commission that gathered
thousands of pages of testimonies and evidence of forced disappearances. Within
a year, trials (and later, some convictions) of the junta leaders followed.253 But
after the initial wave of prosecutions, the military and its supporters began to
push back, including through armed uprisings. Fearful of a new coup, the
Argentine Congress passed two laws to halt investigations and prosecutions for
Dirty War abuses. In 1989 and 1990, Alfonsin's successor, Carlos Menem,
pardoned those in prison for atrocities, including the junta members.
Over the next fifteen years, activists would press for accountability with a
broad range .of actions, from trials that sought truth (since punishment had been
barred), to symbolic actions, such as public shaming of known dirty war
criminals. In Argentina, the Inter-American system played a crucial role
throughout the two-decade period of transition.
In 1992, the Inter-American Commission issued a final report in a case
against Argentina (and a parallel case against Uruguay), holding the two nations'
amnesty laws in violation of the American Convention on Human Rights. These
decisions faced significant resistance by the governments of Argentina and
Uruguay. These States questioned the Commission's decision indirectly in a
request for an advisory opinion. The effort, in legal terms, backfired as the Court
largely affirmed the competencies of the Commission. The Commission's 1992
decision would prove vital to civil society groups pressing for accountability
domestically.
Years later, the Inter-American Court definitively held that amnesties such
as Argentina's were inconsistent with the Convention.2 54 While the case
addressed legislation in Peru, it provided clear guidance for courts throughout
the region on the Convention's standards for accountability in cases of massive
human rights violations, including mass atrocity.
In 2005, the Argentine Supreme Court ruled its amnesty laws invalid,
directly applying the holding in Barrios Altos to Argentina.255 Shortly thereafter,
212 Id. at 107-108.
253 Paula K. Speck, The Trial of the Argentine Junta: Responsibilities and Realities, 18 U. MIAM INTER-
AM. L. REv. 491, 502 (1987).
254 Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, 51 (Mar. 14, 2001).
25 The Supreme Court applied the Barrios Altos ruling regarding the invalidity of amnesty laws in the
Simon Case. See generally Santiago Legarre, Crimes against Humanity, Reasonableness and the Law:
The Simon Case in the Supreme Court ofArgentina, 5 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 723 (2006).
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prosecutors throughout the country reopened investigations and prosecutions
into grave rights abuses committed three decades earlier. Over the past decade
plus, these prosecutions have continued, targeting high profile defendants, such
as junta leader Jorge Videla.2 56 Today, the consensus position of the major
Argentine political parties repudiates the military dictatorship and its legacy of
gross violations of human rights and recognizes the legitimacy of the Inter-
American human rights system in the domestic political and legal order.
2. Chile
On September 11, 1973, military forces seized power in Chile, violently
overthrowing democratically elected socialist President Salvador Allende. The
military government of General Augusto Pinochet oversaw widespread
repression that included the forced disappearance of approximately 3,000 people
and the detention and torture of thousands more. The military junta restricted
basic civil rights, censored media publications, and forced through a new
Constitution in 1980. In 1978 it promulgated an amnesty to block future
prosecution of its crimes.
In October 1988, the government orchestrated a referendum on Pinochet's
continuance in power. In the face of pressure within Chile and from outside, the
military was unable to impose its will through the plebiscite, yet exerted
significant control over the transition and beyond. Patricio Aylwin won elections
a year later and took office in March 1990. Before handing over power, however,
the military government created numerous institutional means to restrict the new
democratic government's power, including seats in the upper legislative house
for various military allies and significant autonomy for the military. These
arrangements, along with Pinochet's vocal threats to intervene in politics after
the transition, restricted the new authorities' ability to reverse the amnesty law.
Throughout the decades of military rule, the Inter-American human rights
system played an important role in these legal and political developments.
During the years of Pinochet's rule, the Inter-American Commission produced a
series of reports on rights abuse in Chile. These reports both maintained
international pressure on Chile (relevant to the junta's decision to accept the
outcome of the 1988 plebiscite), and also established a historical record that
could add to the basis for prosecutions years later.
In this context, the October 1998 arrest in London of former dictator
Augusto Pinochet at the request of Spanish investigating judge Baltasar Garz6n
sent shock waves throughout Chile, energizing the human rights and
accountability movement and forcing Chilean diplomats to promise advances in
dormant investigations and prosecutions.
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After his return to Chile, Pinochet lost much of his support. In this context,
pressures to reopen investigations and to not apply the amnesty law intensified.
The Inter-American Court played a helpful role in 2006 by ordering the
government of Chile to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the
September 1973 extrajudicial killing of Luis Alfredo Almonacid Arellano, thus
providing legal and political support for Chilean judges seeking not to apply the
1979 Amnesty Law.257 At this writing, a consensus prevails among the political
class in Chile and in society broadly regarding the illegitimacy of the military
dictatorship and its record of human rights abuse and in support of the Inter-
American human rights system.
3. Brazil
On March 31, 1964, a military coup ousted president Jodo Goulart, ushering
in more than two decades of military rule. The first several years of military rule
involved restrictions on political participation and rights abuse, but only after
1968, under Institutional Act No. 5, did the regime routinely employ the harshest
forms of repression. The Brazilian coup was the first in a wave that would later
reach southern cone neighbors Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile. The military
regime arrested and tortured thousands of dissidents. It also forcibly disappeared
hundreds. While this represents a serious and worrisome number, it is far less in
absolute terms, and less still in per capita terms, than the number disappeared in
Argentina or Chile.
In Brazil, until recently, the role of the Inter-American system had been quite
limited. Rights groups filed some petitions with the Commission during the
worst years of the military dictatorship-just nine petitions filed from 1970 to
1974 258-but this number paled in comparison to the numbers of denunciations
filed in Argentina and Chile. During its visit to Argentina in 1979, for example,
the Commission received thousands of petitions denouncing specific instances
of forced disappearance.
Interestingly, it was not until the Inter-American Court ruled against the
Brazilian amnesty law in the case of Julia Gomes Lund and others vs. Brazil in
November 201 0,259 together with the assumption of the presidency by former
torture victim and political detainee Dilma Rousseff, that Brazil moved to create
an official, national truth commission. Four years later, in December 2014, the
Truth Commission submitted its final report to the president. In the intervening
period, many states in Brazil followed suit, creating state-level truth
commissions. At the same time, a special division of the federal office of the
257 Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (set. C) No. 154, 65 (Sept. 26, 2006).258 See FLAVIA PIOVESAN, DIREITOS HUMANOS E o DIRErrO CONSTITUCIONAL INTERNACIONAL 257
(4th ed., 2000).
259 Gomes Lund et al. v. Brazil, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), at 113 (Nov. 24, 2010).
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prosecutor opened scores of investigations and criminal complaints in ten
cases. 260
The years following the termination of the work of the truth commission
took a dangerous turn for human rights in Brazil. Economic stagnation and mass
protests in 2013 marked the beginning of a significant change in national politics,
as disenchantment with limited growth fueled protests and political mobilization
against the ruling Workers' Party. In addition, what began as an investigation
into a car wash (known as Operation Lava Jato, for its Portuguese name)
mushroomed into a sweeping inquiry and prosecution of widespread corruption
in Brazilian politics. The lava jato investigation engulfed many in the ruling
party and the opposition, but its focus was clearly on the Workers' Party and
former President Lula. These forces encouraged a successful push by center and
right parties to impeach President Dilma Rouseff in 2015 and 2016. Then, the
2018 elections swept extreme right-wing candidate Jair Bolsonaro into office.
Bolsonaro, a former military officer and Congressman, has repeatedly
questioned basic principles of rule of law and human rights. In 1999, Bolsonaro
revealed his views on mass atrocity: "[Things] will only change on the day that
we break out in civil war here and do the job that the military regime didn't do:
killing 30,000. If some innocent people die, that's fine."
261
Bolsonaro represents violent opposition to the core principles of human
rights and the rule of law. As one of us (Cavallaro) and Fernando Delgado
explained in 2012, Brazil at that time had among the lowest levels of public
support for democracy in the Western Hemisphere. We posited that this resulted
from the relatively limited accountability for human rights violations during the
dictatorship, which in turn resulted in part from Brazil's failure to engage with
international human rights oversight.
[A]ccountability for the gross violations of human rights
committed by agents of the military dictatorship in Brazil
(1964-1985) has, on the whole, been extremely limited.... We
suggest... a causal relationship between, on the one hand, this
failure of accountability and, on the other, the incomplete
support for democracy in Brazil, the continued severe human
rights abuses in the country, and the legitimacy gap plaguing
human rights defenders in Brazil today.
2 62
261 See MINISTtRIO POBLICO FEDERAL, GRUPO DE TRABALHO JUSTIA DE TRANSICAO: ATIVIDADES DE
PERSECU;AO PENAL DESENVOLVIDAS PELO MINISTtRIO PuBLICO FEDERAL 2011/2013 (2014).
261 Mariana Sim6es, Brazil's Polarizing New President, Jair Bolsonaro, in His Own Words, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/world/americas/brazil-president-jair-bolsonaro-
quotes.html.
262 James L. Cavallaro & Fernando Delgado, The Paradox ofAccountability in Brazil, in AFTER
OPPRESSION: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA AND EASTERN EUROPE 86, 86 (Vesselin
Popovski & M6nica Serrano eds., 2012). The other factors noted were "the extended effects of the
country's top-down transition, the comparatively lower numbers of victims of mass atrocity, at least by
Latin American standards; [and] the surge in crime that accompanied the transition to democratic rule."
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Brazil's relative isolation with regard to the Inter-American system
manifested itself in a significantly lower number of petitions to the Commission
and matters litigated in the system, relatively late ratification of the American
Convention (1992), and delayed acceptance of the contentious jurisdiction of the
Court (1998). In 1994, for example, there were just two petitions pending before
the Inter-American Commission; the first contentious case against Brazil was not
submitted until 2005. By then, the system had decided thousands of matters
against other authoritarian regimes in the Americas.
The failure of accountability in Brazil, we argue, is directly related to the
limited role and applicability of the Inter-American system. By contrast, in
Argentina and Chile, while the degree of commitment to human rights has
varied, neither has turned away from core human rights principles so
dramatically. This, we argue, is a result-at least in part-of how embedded the
Inter-American human rights system has become in those States and how much
influence the system has exerted to promote accountability and a culture of
human rights. Earlier, the visibility of the work of the Commission likely led the
Argentine junta and the Chilean regime to limit abuses.
C. African Regional Human Rights System
The African regional human rights system has struggled to reduce human
rights violations, including mass atrocities, and to induce States to investigate
and prosecute those responsible for them. Younger and less supported by its
Member States, it has had much less impact than its European and Inter-
American counterparts. For this reason, and because the African system has
received less scholarly attention, it yields fewer insights into how international
institutions can promote the goals of concern to us and we devote less space to
it.
Two African institutions are dedicated to the protection and promotion of
human rights across the continent: the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, which opened in 1987, and the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights, which opened in 2006.263 The Commission and Court oversee
Member States' compliance mainly with the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights ("African Charter" or "Charter"), which entered into force in
1986.2 4 (We use "Commission" and "Court" in this Section to refer to the
African Commission and African Court.) Fifty-four States are party to the
263 Several regional courts also address human rights questions occasionally, but also deal with other
disputes, such as over trade. See FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 487-
94 (2d ed. 2012). In addition, several organs of the African Union have human rights-related
responsibilities. See id. at 169-205; ChristofHeyns & Magnus Killander, The African Regional Human
Rights System, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES
509, 523-24 (Felipe G6mez Isa & Koen de Feyter eds., 2006).
264 Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 29, art. 3. The Court has jurisdiction over cases involving
the African Charter "and any other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the states concerned."
Id.
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African Charter-all of the members of the African Union (AU, formerly the
Organization of African Unity (OAU)) except Morocco.26 5
1. African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
Scholars of the African Commission generally agree that its contribution to
human rights has been modest, and even minimal.26 6 Frans Viljoen concludes
that "on the whole the Commission has failed" to effectively protect human
rights.267 Scholarship on the Commission remains thin, so its work may be
having impact under the surface.2 68  Still, Rachel Murray and Elizabeth
Mottershaw report that there is "an increasing sense of frustration among
litigants and others about the integrity and reputation of the African
Commission," 269 while Viljoen judges that "the Commission's track record does
not inspire confidence."2 70 Some recent changes, including the creation of the
African Court, give some reason to hope that the Commission may have more
effect in the future, however.
The Commission's primary activity consists of evaluating individual
complaints of human rights violations by State parties to the Charter. These can
be submitted directly to it by individuals, groups of them, or NGOs, after
exhaustion of available domestic remedies. 271 However, scholars agree that
States largely ignore the Commission when it finds them to have violated human
rights in particular cases and recommends remedies. 272 The most extensive study
265 See List of Countries which have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, AFR..UNION (June 15, 2017), https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-sl-
african charter on human_and_peoplesrights_2.pdf.266 See, e.g., RACHEL MURRAY & DEBRA LONG, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINDINGS OF THE
AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 4 (2015); VILJOEN, supra note 263, at 295-
99; Gina Bekker, The African Commission on Human and Peoples 'Rights and Remedies for Human
Rights Violations, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REv. 499, 500-501 (2013); Heyns & Killander, supra note 263, at
538; Makau Mutua, The African Human Rights Court: A Two-Legged School?, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 342,
353 (1999) (characterizing the creation of the African Court as "an acknowledgment of [the
Commission's] general ineffectiveness"). But see Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Responding to Human Rights
Violations in Africa, 7 INT'L HUM. RTS L. REv. 1, 40 (2018) (concluding that the Commission has
"greatly contributed to the regional protection of human rights in Africa").
267 VILJOEN, supra note 263, at 297.
268 See MURRAY & LONG, supra note 266; VILJOEN, supra note 263, at 289-390.
269 Rachel Murray & Elizabeth Mottershaw, Mechanisms for the Implementation of Decisions of the
African Commission on Human andPeoples'Rights, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 349, 372 (2014).
270 VILJOEN, supra note 263, at 298.
271 Id. at 304; African Charter, supra note 29, art. 56. The Commission can hear inter-State complaints,
but only one has ever been filed. Ssenyonjo, supra note 266, at 10.
272 Bekker, supra note 266, at 515; Murray & Mottershaw, supra note 269, at 350-51; Lutz Oette,
Litigation Before the African Commission on Human and Peoples 'Rights and the Struggle Against
Torture in Sudan, 54 SUDAN STUDIES FOR SOUTH SUDAN AND SUDAN 20, 30 (2016); Ssenyonjo, supra
note 266, at 20; George Mukundi Wachira & Abiola Ayinla, Twenty Years of Elusive Enforcement of the
Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples 'Rights: A Possible Remedy, 6
AFRICAN HUM. RTS. L.J. 465, 466-467 (2006) (stating that "the attitude of state parties ... by and large
has been generally to ignore these recommendations [made by the Commission after finding violations
of Charter rights], with no attendant consequences" (internal citations omitted)). The only effort to
comprehensively survey State compliance covered only decisions issued from 1994 to 2004. It found
that States had fully complied in only six of the forty-four cases studied. See Frans Viljoen & Lirette
Louw, State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights, 1994-2004, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (2007).
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of the impact of the Commission's findings recognized that, in theory, those
findings could influence State behavior in a variety of ways beyond inducing
respondent States to follow recommendations in individual cases. For example,
Commission findings could inform national courts' application of the Charter to
cases before them.273 The authors found little evidence that these and other
hypothesized effects actually occurred, however.
274
Africans have suffered mass atrocities in dozens of instances since the
Commission was created in 1987, yet the Commission has had no discernible
impact on their incidence. Article 58 of the Charter creates a procedure by which
the Commission can sound the alarm about "serious or massive violations of
human and peoples' rights," by referring them to the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government of the AU (formerly that of the OAU). 275 Early in its lifetime,
the Commission referred a number of cases to the Assembly under Article 58,
but the Assembly took no action.276 As Chidi Odinkalu notes, the OAU
Assembly was the regional organ "whose members were most likely to be self-
interested or deeply implicated in mass atrocities. 277 By 2006 the Commission
had given up on the Article 58 referral procedure, but did not craft an alternative
approach to mass atrocity situations. 278 Field investigations were impossible in
most cases, because governments were unable or unwilling to protect
Commissioners and their staff.2 7 9 In the few cases the Commission did
investigate, such as Zimbabwe and Darfur (Sudan), its reports had little impact
on the AU.28 0 The Commission has seldom ordered provisional measures to
protect individual complainants while it considered their cases, and when it has,
"states almost uniformly disregarded them." 281 "[B]y never filling the lacuna left
by the [OAU] Assembly's inaction [on the Commission's Article 58 referrals],
the Commission remains without a coherent strategy to deal with" such
atrocities.282
Much of the Commission's weakness stems from forces outside its control.
Resource scarcity, poverty, unscrupulous leaders, weak institutions, ethnic
273 See MURRAY & LONG, supra note 266, at 69-86.
211 Id. The other activities of the Commission, such as periodic reports by State parties and Commission
field visits to States, have had similarly modest impact. See id. at 45-50, 63-66; VLLJOEN, supra note
263, at 296-97; Heyns & Killander, supra note 263, at 528-29.
27' African Charter, supra note 29, art 58(1). The Charter does not define "serious or massive
violations,' and the Commission has never done so either, but the Commission's practice suggests an
understanding of the term similar to what we refer to as "mass atrocities," although perhaps broader. See
Rachel Murray, Serious or Massive Violations under the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights: A Comparison with the Inter-American and European Mechanisms, 17 NETHERLANDS Q. HUM.
RTS. 109, 110-14 (1999).
"7 See Heyns & Killander, supra note 263, at 527-28.
277 Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, From Architecture to Geometry: The Relationship Between the African
Commission on Human and Peoples'Rights and Organs of the African Union, 35 HuM. RTS. Q. 850,
862 (2013).
278 Heyns & Killander, supra note 263, at 528.
279 Odinkalu, supra note 277, at 863.
280 Id.
281 VILJOEN, supra note 263, at 306.
282 Id. at 295-96. The Commission arguably has taken a significant stand against mass atrocities by
refusing to allow States to derogate from any of their human rights obligations even when faced with
genuine emergencies, such as civil wars. See, e.g., id. at 333-34.
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tensions, and outside predation have led to more frequent incidents of mass
atrocity within the jurisdiction of the African regional human rights institutions
than within the jurisdictions of the European or Inter-American regional human
rights institutions. 283 Unlike in Europe and Latin America, no powerful bloc of
African States has exerted sustained pressure on others to improve their human
rights performance. In the view of some scholars, African States deliberately
hamstrung the Charter and Commission, meaning them to serve only as fig
leaves to disguise the States' disregard for human rights.284 The Commission's
recommendations are generally not considered to be legally binding.285 States
have compromised the Commission's independence by appointing
Commissioners who are closely connected to, and even employed by, their home
governments.286 The Commission's limited budget and the AU's "cumbersome"
hiring procedures keep its staff tiny, averaging just five legal officers, and
resource constraints "seriously impair the efficiency and professionalism of [the
Commission's] Secretariat. ' 287 Under these circumstances, the Commission has
been unable to help prevent mass atrocity or promote accountability for it.
2. African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights
The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights was created by a protocol
to the African Charter.288 The Court began work in 2006289 and issued its first
decision on the merits of a case in 2013.290 However, it has not yet played a
significant role in preventing atrocity crimes, even though such crimes have
occurred in many places across the continent since its creation, including
Burundi, Egypt, Libya, and South Sudan. 291 The Court has not issued an advisory
opinion or merits decision in a contentious case that is relevant to atrocity crimes.
Its sole relevant action has been to order provisional measures in a case brought
by the Commission against Libya during the "Arab Spring" regarding the
Gaddafi regime's violent repression of protests. Just nine days after receiving the
Commission's application, the Court ordered Libya to refrain from violating
283 See Heyns & Killander, supra note 263, at 541.
... See Bekker, supra note 266, at 505-06; Makau Mutua, The African Human Rights System in a
Comparative Perspective, 3 REV. AFR. COMM. HUM. & PEOPLES' RTS 5, 7-11 (1993). The Charter has
been criticized as less protective of human rights than other major human rights treaties. See, e.g.,
Mutua, supra note 266, at 358-60.
285 See, e.g., FROM JUDGMENT TO JUSTICE, supra note 166, at 96; ViJOEN, supra note 263, at 339.
286 See VIJOEN, supra note 263, at 290-91; Bekker, supra note 266, at 500 n.3.
287 VILJOEN, supra note 263, at 293-94; see also Bekker, supra note 266, at 500 n.3 (noting the
Commission's "lack of funding"); Murray & Mottershaw, supra note 269, at 366 (characterizing the
Commission as "under-resourced").
288 Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 29.
289 See African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights [Afr. Ct. H.P.R.], 8th Ordinary Sess., Activity
Report of the Court for 2006, at 3, Assembly/AU/8(VEII) (Jan. 29-30, 2007).
" Mtikila v. Tanzania, No. 011/2011, Decision, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
[Afr. Ct. H.P.R.], (June 14, 2013), http://en.african-court.org/index.php/55-finalised-cases-details/843-
app-no-011-201 1-rev-christopher-r-mtikila-v-united-republic-of-tanzania-details.
291 See HUMAN RiGHTS WATCH, 2019 WORLD REPORT 101 (2019) (Burundi); id. at 184-86 (Egypt); id.
at 358-59 (Libya); id. at 536-39 (South Sudan).
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human rights.2 92 There is no evidence that the Court's order had any impact on
the ground, however, as the Gaddafi regime continued to attack civilians.
293
Blame for the Court's inaction lies largely with the States themselves and
with the Commission. No State has submitted a complaint to the Court over
atrocity crimes, and only nine of the thirty States that recognize the jurisdiction
of the Court have allowed it to receive complaints against them from individuals
or NGOs. 29 4 The Commission can refer complaints to the Court against any of
the thirty State parties, yet has done so only in only a few cases and only one-
the Libya case-involving atrocity crimes.
295
The Court may be waiting to address mass atrocities until it has accumulated
more influence over States, which may come if States develop a habit of
complying with its orders in cases with lower political stakes. 29 6 In 2015, the
Court declined a request by NGOs for an advisory opinion on whether the Rome
Statute obligated African States that were members of the ICC to arrest Sudan's
then-president, Omar Al Bashir, whom the ICC had indicted.297 The Court turned
down the request using exceptionally thin and formalistic reasoning, laid bare by
a dissenting judge.298 The majority may, however, have been wise to evade the
highly contentious issue of whether one State should arrest the incumbent leader
of another. The legal merits of the case favored the NGOs, but the Court was less
than ten years old, had little sway with African citizens, and had yet to issue a
high-profile decision, let alone induce implementation. Its judges had little hope
of changing the politics around the Al Bashir case. Had they ruled that States
must arrest him, and been ignored, they would likely have highlighted their
Court's weakness and thus diminished its authority.
African Court judges recognize that it will take time to build their Court's
influence and that they can promote it through activities beyond judging cases,
as Nicole De Silva shows. 2 9 9 Early on these judges observed that they "'need[ed]
to strengthen a judicial culture' in African states," expand the Court's
jurisdiction, and increase its authority.3 °° They took measures that included
292 Afr. Comm'n H.P.R. v. Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 004/2011, Order for




293 See, e.g., Libya: Indiscriminate Attacks Kill Civilians, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 17, 2011)
https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/17/libya-indiscriminate-attacks-kill-civilians.
294 See Welcome to the African Court, AFR. CT. OF HUM. & PEOPLES' RTs., http://en.african-court.org
(last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
29 See Murray & Mottershaw, supra note 269, at 367.
296 "Habit" is a shorthand for political and institutional arrangements and norms, both formal and
informal, that can develop over time.
297 Request for Advisory Opinion by the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, et al., No. 1 of
2015, Order Striking Out Request, p.4, Nov. 29, 2015. Six months earlier the Court had declined a
similar request that the NGO requesters apparently failed to pursue. Request for Advisory Opinion by
the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, et al., No. 1 of 2014, Order Striking Out Request,
June 5, 2015.
29 See id., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ouguergouz, at IlI.
299 De Silva, supra note 18, at 288-89.
'oo Id. at 288.
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"African Court officials [including judges] travelling across Africa, holding
workshops with the Court's full range of stakeholders, including governmental
officials, national judges, civil society organizations, and the media." 30 1 The
Court's appreciation that international institutions must develop their power
through engagement with other actors, and readiness to invest in activities
beyond judges' traditional role of hearing cases and issuing decisions, may help
develop the institution into one able to prevent and secure accountability for
mass atrocity-as the European Court and Inter-American Court and
Commission have become.
V. COMPARING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALs
AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS
Preventing mass atrocities, and securing criminal accountability for those
who commit them, are among the most compelling purposes of the international
system. As we have seen, the European Court and Inter-American System have
significantly advanced both goals, while the African Commission and Court and
the ICC have struggled. This Part analyzes the reasons for that divergence. It
argues that the best way for the ICC to overcome its current crisis is to take
lessons from the regional mechanisms' approach and its effective
implementation in Europe and the Americas. Our analysis incorporates new data
on the comparative costs (and thus efficiency) of these institutions.
The Inter-American System and European Court have built an impressive
record in reducing the incidence of mass atrocities and securing criminal
accountability for them. Mass atrocity is now rare in their jurisdictions, although
not eliminated. Perpetrators are much more likely to be prosecuted than in past
decades, although this is hardly certain. The Inter-American System has had the
most success. The influence of the Inter-American Commission and Court has
no doubt been enhanced by a series of political transitions that have swept
perpetrators of mass atrocities from power. Still, these institutions have played
central roles in the development of norms and legal doctrines that successor
democratic regimes-and activists pressuring them--have used to delegitimate
perpetrators, erode their political power, and eventually prosecute them. The
European Court of Human Rights has tried with increasing vigor to pressure the
Turkish and Russian governments to investigate, prosecute, and punish mass
atrocities in the Kurdish southeast and Chechnya, with some results. It also has
succeeded in preventing State counterterrorism campaigns from devolving into
mass atrocity.
The African system has managed less so far. The African Commission's
structural weaknesses, the massive scale of human rights violations in the
countries over which it has jurisdiction, and many African States' thin
commitment to human rights have prevented the Commission from contributing
significantly either to efforts to secure criminal accountability for mass atrocities
301 Id.
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or to prevent them. The African Court is too young to assess confidently,
although its judges are making efforts to develop its influence.
What accounts for the achievements of the Inter-American System and
European Court? Their judges, commissioners, and staff have labored for
decades to build their institutions' authority. Through multiple channels, they
have affected the behavior of domestic politicians, prosecutors, and judges, and
through them the potential perpetrators of atrocities, such as police, soldiers, and
rebels. That is to say, these international institutions have altered the complex
causal ecosystems that determine whether atrocities are committed in particular
situations, and the distinct ones that determine whether those responsible are
identified, prosecuted, and punished. These three institutions have employed
varying methods-Alexandra Huneeus and Mikael Rask Madsen contrast the
Inter-American Commission's "political approach" with the two courts' "legal
diplomacy"--but all have skillfully, strategically, and patiently balanced
confrontation with and deference to national actors, informed by appreciation of
national political, legal, and in some cases social and military contexts.
302
These regional bodies have been most effective when they have understood
their limitations and found ways to contribute to locally driven efforts. All the
institutions we have assessed were designed as complements to national political
and legal systems. Their designers viewed domestic actors as primarily
responsible for preventing human rights violations, including mass atrocity, and
holding perpetrators accountable when they occurred. "[S]upranational tribunals
will generally have the greatest impact when their procedures and judgments are
relevant to the actors working to advance specific human rights in these
countries, including not only State agents but also human rights organizations,
social movements, and the media."
30 3
Whether the ICC will develop similar influence remains to be seen. To be
sure, at seventeen years of age, it has had much less time to do so than the 60-
year-old European Court and Inter-American Commission and the 40-year-old
Inter-American Court. While there is meaningful scholarship on its impact, that
corpus is small and not yet conclusive.
Yet the ICC's high profile, and cost, may give it less time to prove its worth
to States, potential perpetrators, the media, and victims. Rather than following
those regional institutions in building its credibility and power gradually, the ICC
appears to have squandered both, as indictees have evaded capture, politicians
have intimidated witnesses until the cases against them collapsed, and half of the
few defendants who have faced trial have walked free after acquittal. As political
scientist Mark Kersten recently commented: "Acquittals are part and parcel of
any normal criminal court. ... However, whenever a case involving mass
302 Compare Alexandra Huneeus & Mikael Rask Madsen, Between Universalism and Regional Law and
Politics: A Comparative History of the American, European, and African Human Rights Systems, 16
INT'L J. CON. L. 136, 145 (2018) (Inter-American Commission) with id at 146 (Inter-American Court)
and id. at 146-47 (European Court).
303 Cavallaro & Brewer, supra note 177, at 775.
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atrocities essentially collapses at the ICC, it does damage to the perception of the
Court as a credible and effective institution of international justice." 3°4
The problem is not that the ICC lacks resources. Table 1 compares the
budgets of the ICC and the regional bodies, compiled from their respective
reports. The ICC's budget vastly exceeds those of all of the regional institutions.
Between 2011 and 2018, the ICC cost about fifteen times as much as the Inter-
American Commission and the African Court, twenty-four times as much as the
African Commission, and thirty-three times as much as the Inter-American
Court. The European Court of Human Rights appears comparatively extravagant
at 58% of the cost of the ICC-until one considers that only a fraction of its
2,700 merits decisions each year involve mass atrocities. (The same is true of the
other regional institutions' dockets.) We estimate the portion of the European
Court's budget attributable to mass atrocity by computing the proportion of its
decisions that involve violations of bodily integrity rights-the rights to life and
freedom from torture, inhuman treatment, and slavery and forced labor. This
method produces an inflated figure because many of those cases would fall
outside the ICC's jurisdiction and our definition of mass atrocity.3 °5 Yet the
ICC's budget is more than four times the resulting (over-)estimate of the
European Court's budget attributable to mass atrocities.
3 Mark Kersten, Some Quick Reflections on the Gbagbo Acquittal at the ICC, JUST. IN CONFLICT (Jan.
18, 2019), https://justiceinconflict.org/2019/01/18/some-quick-reflections-on-the-gbagbo-acquittal-at-
the-icc/.
305 See supra text accompanying notes 30-33. For example, most of these cases do not arise from
situations in which such human rights violations occur on a mass scale.
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The analysis in this Article suggests that a misconception of the relationship
of the International Criminal Court to national political and judicial systems has
led to a misallocation of these resources: the ICC's judges and prosecutors have
over-emphasized their own investigation and prosecution of individual cases of
mass atrocities, and under-emphasized other means of reducing mass atrocity
and securing accountability, including prosecutions by national authorities. They
have, in short, seen themselves as primary agents of international justice, rather
than-as the framers of the Rome Statute envisioned-secondary,
complementary actors in a more complex system of accountability and
prevention that operates both transnationally and within States. Their focus on
traditional judicial activities and over-confidence in the impact of law and courts
reflect a legalism that misapprehends the sources of political and social
change.
30 6
Pragmatism, as well as principle, dictates that the ICC should follow
regional human rights institutions by complementing other actors' efforts rather
than focusing on trials in The Hague. The ICC's poor prosecution record shows
that its prosecutors and judges have moved too aggressively on individual cases.
They have overestimated states' willingness and capacity to arrest indictees
(such as former Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir) and to protect witnesses
against intimidation. They may have brought cases to trial without sufficient
evidence, such as that against former C6te d'Ivoire President Laurent Gbagbo.30 7
These failures have both stemmed from and exacerbated the ICC's lack of
authority. Instead of patiently building its influence, as the European Court and
Inter-American institutions did, the ICC has rushed to confront individuals who
had the guile or power to evade or defy it, often with support from States.
National legal systems possess key advantages in prosecuting mass
atrocities. These partly explain the success of the Inter-American System,
especially, in securing accountability for mass atrocities. For most cases, the vast
bulk of investigative activity, including interviewing witnesses and collecting
documents and physical evidence, must occur in the country where the crime
occurred. Local investigators and prosecutors are more likely than their
international counterparts to speak relevant languages and understand the myriad
aspects of their country's history, politics, social structure, and culture that may
be relevant to how particular atrocities occurred and who can be held criminally
responsible. They therefore can work more quickly and accurately, with less
assistance from hired experts.
These and other factors make national systems more cost-efficient than the
ICC when investigating and prosecuting mass atrocity cases, as well as quicker
and more effective. To be sure, part of the vast gap between the ICC's and
3
"See, e.g., Kieran McEvoy, Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional
Justice, 34 J. LAW & SOC'Y 411,412-24 (2007).
307 After the Gbagbo and Bemba acquittals, the ICTY's first Prosecutor commented that the ICC OTP
needed "to expend greater effort in ensuring that cases brought to trial are fully investigated and
supported by sufficient evidence." Richard Goldstone, Acquittals by the International Criminal Court,
EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/acquittals-by-the-intermational-criminal-court/.
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regional institutions' budgets arises because the latter outsource expensive
investigation and prosecution functions to national systems. But this is not the
whole story-national systems also perform those tasks more economically than
the ICC does. Scale yields some economies: national systems maintain large
teams of investigators, prosecutors, and judges to handle ordinary crimes in the
country. Others stem from location and expertise: national investigators and
prosecutors need not pay for flights from The Hague or, in many cases,
translators. Finally, ICC salaries far exceed those in the national justice systems
of middle- and low-income countries, where most mass atrocities occur.
The other goal on which this Article focuses, preventing future atrocities,
also supports a preference for national-level prosecution. Political leaders and
military commanders who might order or commit atrocities, as well as the media
and ordinary citizens whose attention and pressure could influence them, may
pay more heed to decisions by judges in their own countries than ones by
foreigners far away in The Hague. Journalists can follow proceedings conducted
in their own country and national language more easily and at lower cost than
those at the ICC. Citizens thus receive more information about local proceedings.
Defendants may find it more difficult to delegitimize a court staffed by local
judges, whose proceedings are comprehensible to journalists and the public, than
a "foreign" court.3 °8
The ICC should follow the European and Inter-American regional systems
not only in aiming to promote national prosecutions, but in taking a more
sophisticated approach to reducing atrocities and increasing accountability. It
should recognize that its influence flows through many channels, usually
indirectly, and often independently of its individual cases. Indeed, its eagerness
to prosecute may exacerbate conflict and atrocity, as it may have in Uganda. The
court's weakness in investigating, prosecuting, and judging cases; the greater
effectiveness, efficiency, and legitimacy of national-level proceedings; and the
evidence of the court's indirect impact described in Section III.C support our
conclusion that the ICC should focus less on investigating and prosecuting cases
itself. Instead, the court should focus more on influencing national-level political
and legal dynamics to increase national prosecutions and decrease atrocity
through means other than its own cases, including during preliminary
examinations.
The ICC can exert this influence through many kinds of actions. 0 9 Its staff
can assess national proceedings and press national authorities to move more
aggressively; advocate against amnesties (as in Colombia); and track political,
military, and legal developments. They can educate, pressure, and ally with
politicians, military leaders, diplomats, conflict mediators, human rights groups,
308 See, generally, Marko Milanovid, Establishing the Facts About Mass Atrocities: Accounting for the
Failure of the ICTYto Persuade Target Audiences, 47 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1321 (2016) (analyzing the
causes of widespread skepticism among Serbs toward the ICTY's findings).
" Many academics and activists have offered insightful analysis of how the Court can stimulate and
support national prosecutions and shift the causal ecosystem of atrocities. E.g., William W. Burke-
White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome
System ofInternational Justice, 49 HARv. J. INT'L L. 53, 85-105 (2008).
[Vol. 45: 1
When Prosecution is Not Enough
the media, and the public. The ICC should expand its outreach activities and
build the capacity of local activists, prosecutors, and judges. 310 A recent book-
length report by Human Rights Watch documented the impact of OTP efforts to
foster national-level accountability during preliminary examinations. 311 It
offered a rich array of ideas for increasing the court's impact. For example, the
ICC could do more to "focus[] public debate through media and within civil
society on the need for accountability," share OTP analysis with human rights
activists advocating domestic prosecution, and mobilize intemational aid to
strengthen national courts.
3 12
Such efforts will require subtle judgment and deep expertise in the politics,
legal systems, and in some cases military situations and social organization of
the countries in which the ICC works. At each turn, ICC staff should consider
how they can affect national and sometimes international actors, and dynamics
that link them, to reduce the likelihood of future atrocities and promote national-
level accountability. (In some cases, like Colombia, those objectives may be in
tension.) They should recognize the limits of their influence and operate
strategically to enhance it over time, within each situation and globally, with
elites and the public, following the examples of the Inter-American Commission
and Court and the European Court.
Critics may argue that lawyers and judges are incapable of understanding
the complex political, social, and legal systems (what we have called causal
ecosystems) that determine mass atrocities and national prosecutions, and thus
should not try to affect them. A more limited ambition, to investigate and
prosecute individual cases, may be safer. This skepticism has some merit. We do
not believe lawyers are gods and we acknowledge that most lack skill in
analyzing interactions among law, politics, and society. Indeed, the successes
and failures described in this Article show that international legal institutions
have limited sway and their judges and staff make mistakes. But we can expect
more of those we charge with the extraordinarily important work of reducing
atrocity and increasing accountability. The ICC should hire judges and staff, at
least at the senior level, who are capable of engaging in the sophisticated analysis
necessary to promote those goals. They need not perform this difficult work
alone: the court will need staff with expertise beyond law, such as political
advisors- whom it has been reluctant to engage 313 -sociologists, and
diplomats. 314 Academic institutions may be able to produce studies that help it
design country-specific strategies. 315 This multidisciplinary, cooperative
approach would remedy lawyers' limitations.
310 Wierda, supra note 7, at 287-90; see also Jane Stromseth, Justice on the Ground? International
Criminal Courts and Domestic Rule of Law Building in Conflict-Affected Societies, 50 NOMOS 169,
181-84, 188-90 (2011).
311 See PRESSURE POINT, supra note 119.
312 Id. at2.
313 Wierda, supra note 7, at 286.
314 See Stromseth, supra note 310, at 210.
315 The former United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General for Business and Human
Rights, John Ruggie, augmented his modest budget by convincing law firms and academics to conduct
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Cost should not be an objection to our prescription. 3 16 The ICC's Prosecutor,
Fatou Bensouda, has stated that by promoting national-level prosecutions and
contributing to prevention, preliminary examinations "constitute one of the most
cost-effective ways for the Office [of the Prosecutor] to fulfil the Court's
mission."317 The extreme expense of the ICC's individual cases means that
reducing them modestly would free up considerable resources for other
activities. For example, one or two fewer case investigations each year, and
perhaps one fewer trial every several years, should translate into many more
meetings with national politicians, contributions to training programs for local
prosecutors on how to build mass atrocity cases, strategy sessions with local and
international NGOs, and TV and radio interviews to explain to journalists and
the public how atrocities begin and how they may be averted.
There have been signs that the ICC might move in the direction we urge.
When it has used the threat of prosecution to foster domestic engagement, it has
demonstrated the capacity for effectiveness. For fifteen years, the possibility of
ICC intervention hung over Colombia, pressing the government, paramilitaries,
and rebels to accept accountability mechanisms that had been left out of peace
accords reached elsewhere in the Americas in previous decades. In effect, the
OTP "transformed the preliminary examination from a threshold decision [on
whether to bring criminal cases] into a platform for pressuring the State to
comply with its obligations to hold actors criminally accountable." '3 18 The Court
strengthened the position of civil society actors pressing for justice and pushed
both State and rebel forces to accept accountability. Were the ICC to operate as
strategically in other situations as it has in Colombia, it would multiply its
impact. It would be acting more like a regional body, too.
We are not, of course, suggesting that the ICC abandon its prosecution
function. Its influence depends in part on its being able to credibly threaten-
explicitly or subtly-to prosecute perpetrators of mass atrocities if national
authorities fail to do so. The ICC also needs to function as a backstop when
national courts are too intimidated, corrupt, or overwhelmed to ensure
accountability.
In exercising its investigation and prosecution function, however, the ICC
must behave strategically and patiently develop legitimacy and authority, which
it needs if it is to support prevention and accountability. It should adjust its work
for greater impact, based on attention to context and sophisticated analysis of its
effects on other actors. To be sure, the ICC must operate within its legal mandate
and cannot compromise certain fundamental principles, such as defendants' right
to a fair trial. But those inviolable parameters leave it much latitude. For
example, prosecutors deciding when to release indictments can consider the
extensive research without charge to support his work. See JOHN GERARD RuGGIE, JUST BuSINESS 131,
133 (2013).
316 The ICC's Member States should reverse their historical aversion to using court funds for activities
other than investigation and prosecution. See Wierda supra note 7, at 100.
3'7 Report on Preliminary Examination Activities: 2018, supra note 102, at 8.
38 See Hillebrecht & Huneeus, supra note 103, at 295-96.
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effect of their timing on ongoing conflict. Judges can devote space in their
written decisions to explaining the events that led to crimes, in order to educate
the media and citizens about warning signs.
The OTP should choose its cases more strategically, as well as investigate
and prosecute them more effectively. Before indicting, and perhaps even before
devoting significant resources to investigating, it should assess the chances that
States will help apprehend the suspect in question. It certainly should indict only
when it has enough evidence to nearly ensure conviction at trial and success on
appeal, and confidence that it can prevent witness intimidation from scuttling its
case. Those considerations may affect the choice of which situations to
investigate formally: in some countries, the prospects for apprehending and
convicting anyone may be dim, in which case the ICC may be wise to preserve
its scarce human, financial, and reputational resources for other mass atrocity
situations. (Sadly, it can choose from many.)
ICCjudges, too, should consider their court's institutional needs as they craft
its doctrine. While protecting defendants' rights and developing the law
consistently with ICC and other relevant jurisprudence, they should avoid "na'fve
and pointless act[s] of formalism" and "depart[ures] from settled jurisprudence"
based on "strikingly thin" reasoning-as Harvard professor Alex Whiting
described the Appeals Chamber's 2018 reversal of the Bemba conviction. 319 The
judges' termination of the ICC's investigation of U.S. war crimes in Afghanistan
earlier this year may have avoided a fight with a superpower whose President
relishes attacking weaker adversaries and particularly loathes international
institutions. (The ICC should not always avoid such conflicts. 320 ) However, the
judges blundered by acknowledging, although obliquely, that their decision was
based largely on the unlikelihood that the ICC could secure custody of any U.S.
indictees. 321 That acknowledgment made the ICC look both unprincipled and
powerless, and thus risked diminishing its credibility and influence.
One additional conclusion emerges from our analysis: States, and perhaps
private funders such as foundations, should reinvest in regional human rights
institutions, increasing their budgets. Regional institutions, especially the Inter-
American System and European Court, have impressive records of reducing
mass atrocities, as well as other human rights violations, and promoting
accountability, at extraordinarily low cost-$120 million per year for all
319 See Alex Whiting, Appeals Judges Turn the ICC on its Head with Bemba Decision, JUST SECURITY
(June 14, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/57760/appeals-judges-turn-icc-head-bemba-decision/.
320 When considering the power of potential indictees, and their State supporters, the ICC must balance
pursuing impartial justice, which requires taking on the powerful, with successfully apprehending and
convicting defendants to build credibility as a threat to potential perpetrators and its authority in the
international system. See KERSTEN, supra note 94, at 168-78. The difficulty of this tradeoff reinforces
our prescription that the ICC should de-emphasize individual cases.
321 International Criminal Court, "Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan," 11-02/17,
Apr. 12, 2019.
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combined, less than two percent of the United Nations peacekeeping budget.322
Just five or ten million additional dollars per year for each institution-a minimal
percentage of States' foreign affairs and military budgets-would dramatically
expand their capacity. They could hire more and better staff, process more
complaints, conduct more investigations, and engage more extensively with
governments, civil society, and experts.
VI. CONCLUSION
We share the aspiration of the Rome Statute to end mass atrocity, prosecute
and punish those responsible, and deter future abuses. While no supranational
legal institution can realize those ambitions on its own, the evidence presented
in this Article shows that such bodies can play important roles-if they choose
strategies that fit their capabilities and implement them effectively.
Human rights activists and States concerned with preventing mass atrocity
and bringing perpetrators to justice should not focus exclusively on the ICC.
Regional institutions are extraordinarily efficient as well as effective. Investing
additional resources in them would save lives and enhance accountability.
While the International Criminal Court seems to have had some positive
impact in its first seventeen years, it has woefully underachieved. Its prosecutors
have picked too many fights they could not win, because they lacked sufficient
evidence or the defendants were too powerful. Most indictees remain at large,
several cases have collapsed, and only half of the defendants who have faced
trial have been convicted, a far lower proportion than at other international
criminal tribunals. The court's judges have contributed to these failures with
suspect decisions that caught their own prosecutors-as well as international
experts-by surprise and deprived their court of badly needed victories. The
resulting series of failed cases has called into question whether the ICC can
meaningfully contribute to its founders' vital goals.
The ICC will not realize its potential simply by doing the same thing better.
To be sure, its prosecutors should select cases more carefully, investigate them
more thoroughly, and argue them more persuasively. While the court's judges
must uphold defendants' rights, they need not undercut their institution's
influence by changing the law out of the blue. 3 2 3 But the court as a whole,
including State Parties as well as staff, needs to reconceive its strategy.
Regional human rights institutions provide an alternative model that aligns
with the Rome Statute's basic vision of an International Criminal Court
complementing, not replacing, action at the domestic level. This Article has
322 United Nations Peacekeeping: How We Are Funded, UNITED NATIONS,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded (last visited Dec. 11, 2019) (referring to the $6.5
billion approved budget for UN peacekeeping operations for fiscal year 2019-20).
323 See Van Schaack, supra note 12.
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demonstrated that regional institutions, led by the Inter-American System and
European Court of Human Rights, use their limited powers creatively and
strategically to shift the causal ecosystems that determine when mass atrocity
occurs and when its perpetrators are held accountable. They contribute to those
goals indirectly, through complex interactions with other international and
domestic actors and various political, legal, and social forces. That model is both
more effective and more efficient than the ICC's emphasis to date on
investigating and prosecuting individual cases itself. As the ICC's role in
Colombia illustrates, that court can have positive influence when it deploys its
particular resources shrewdly and with sensitivity to domestic political context-
like a regional institution. In some situations, bringing individual cases may be
unnecessary, Qr even counterproductive.
The ICC can learn from its regional peers' cultivation of authority through
decades of engagement and confrontation with national authorities, buttressed
by human rights advocates in civil society. It should rebalance its strategy and
resources, pursuing fewer individual prosecutions and expanding other efforts to
change the views and behavior of politicians, military leaders, judges, and other
actors. This new approach constitutes the beleaguered court's best hope for
overcoming its current crisis of credibility and its most promising strategy for
advancing the Rome Statute's noble goals.
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